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CYCLES OF PUNISHMENT: THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESTRICTING 
ACCESS TO MENSTRUAL HEALTH 
PRODUCTS IN PRISONS 
Abstract: Despite the recent passage of federal legislation requiring free access 
to menstrual health products in federal prisons, many women in state and local 
prisons continue to have inadequate access to these products. Not only do most 
prisons provide subpar menstrual health products in terms of quality, prisons of-
ten do not provide enough of these products to allow for individuals to change 
their pads and tampons at the doctor-recommended frequency. As a result, incar-
cerated women are at a heightened risk of toxic shock syndrome, sepsis, and 
ovarian cancer. This Note argues that, because differential treatment on the basis 
of menstruation is a form of sex discrimination, the practice of restricting access 
to menstrual health products discriminates on the basis of sex. The practice is 
neither related to a valid penological interest nor an important governmental in-
terest, and therefore violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Moreover, this practice exposes inmates to an unreasonable risk of 
future harm stemming from inadequate menstrual hygiene in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment. In jurisdictions where advocacy groups have been successful 
in drawing significant attention to health issues related to diminished menstrual 
hygiene in prisons, it could be established that prison officials are acting with de-
liberate indifference towards this risk. Thus, this Note will conclude that incar-
cerated women could assert a colorable challenge to the practice of restricting 
access to menstrual health products under either the Fourteenth Amendment or 
the Eighth Amendment. It is crucial that courts institute constitutional barriers to 
these practices in order to protect the health and wellbeing of all prisoners, re-
gardless of gender. 
INTRODUCTION 
Kimberly Haven, an inmate at the Maryland Correctional Institution for 
Women, was provided with twenty-four sanitary pads per month.1 Haven 
quickly realized that the pads provided were hopelessly flimsy, and regularly 
caused women to cancel visits with family or lawyers to avoid the embarrass-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Ann E. Marimow, A New Law Promised Maryland Female Inmates Free Tampons. They’re Still 
Paying, WASH. POST (June 5, 2009), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/a-new-law-
promised-marylands-female-inmates-free-tampons-theyre-still-paying/2019/06/04/cc5442da-86d7-
11e9-a491-25df61c78dc4_story.html [https://perma.cc/7ESF-Z93D] (discussing Maryland’s legisla-
tive efforts to provide free tampons to women in prison and Kimberly Haven’s legislative advocacy). 
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ment of leaks from the pads and bloodstained clothes.2 In an effort to reduce 
leaks and make the short supply of pads last a full menstrual cycle, Haven be-
gan manipulating the pads into makeshift tampons.3 Following Haven’s release 
from prison, she suffered from toxic shock syndrome, a direct result of her 
poor menstrual hygiene throughout her fifteen-month sentence.4 Haven even-
tually had to undergo an emergency hysterectomy.5 
Christine, a twenty-four-year-old inmate at Bedford Hills Correctional 
Facility in New York, was denied access to menstrual health products before a 
visit with her father.6 As the correctional officers strip searched her after the 
visit, she started bleeding on herself.7 The female correctional officer conduct-
ing the search called Christine “disgusting.”8 
The #MeToo movement and the passage of the federal First Step Act in 
2018, which requires federal prisons to provide free pads and tampons to fe-
male inmates, have shed significant light on the problem of access to menstrual 
health products in prison.9 Importantly, the First Step Act only requires that 
                                                                                                                           
 2 Id. Although it is difficult to discuss menstruation without recognizing the experience of 
transgender men and women, for the sake of clarity, “women” in this Note refers to cisgender women. 
A cisgender person is someone whose gender identity matches the gender assigned at birth. What Do 
Transgender and Cisgender Mean?, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.plannedparenthood.org/
learn/teens/all-about-sex-gender-and-gender-identity/what-do-transgender-and-cisgender-mean [https://
perma.cc/FGM9-55PP]. Conversely, a person who is transgender has a gender identity that does not 
match the gender assigned at birth. Id. A transwoman is someone who was assigned male at birth but 
identifies as female, whereas a transman is someone who was assigned female at birth but identifies as 
male. Id. Because cisgender women have ovaries, they are capable of menstruating whereas trans-
women are not. Id. Similarly, because some transmen have ovaries, they are capable of menstruating 
whereas cisgender men are not. Id. 
 3 Marimow, supra note 1. 
 4 Brian Witte, No Tampons in Prison? #MeToo Helps Shine Light on Issue, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Mar. 27, 2018), https://apnews.com/6a1805c4e8204e5b84a0c549ff9b7a31 [https://perma.cc/7M9D-
MNX2] (discussing advocacy by Haven and leaders in the #MeToo movement to encourage state 
legislators to require free, unrestricted access to pads and tampons in prison). 
 5 Id. 
 6 Zoe Greenberg, In Jail, Pads and Tampons as Bargaining Chips, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/nyregion/pads-tampons-new-york-womens-prisons.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/FHS3-4S7L] (outlining the state of access to pads and tampons in prison, as well as 
the ways in which the policies affect women). 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391 § 611, 132 Stat. 5194, 5274 (mandating that federal 
prisons provide free pads and tampons to female inmates); Chandra Bozelko, Opinion, I Was a Pris-
oner. Access to Menstrual Products Isn’t a Luxury. It’s a Basic Human Right, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 26, 
2019), https://www.newsweek.com/prison-menstruation-sanitary-products-human-rights-1375695 
[https://perma.cc/3J2L-XBSF] (arguing for unrestricted access to pads and tampons in prison from the 
perspective of a former inmate); see also Witte, supra note 4 (discussing the impact of the #MeToo 
movement on women in prison). One activist noted that, although access to menstrual health products 
in prison has been a concern for a long time, the issue is gaining attention because of #MeToo and 
women’s changing status in American society. Witte, supra note 4. In this way, women in prison have 
also specifically benefitted from the activism of the women behind #MeToo. See id. 
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prisoners in federal prisons receive an adequate supply of quality menstrual 
health products; for women in state prisons, the First Step Act does not apply.10 
Thirty-eight states currently do not have any legislation requiring prisons to 
provide adequate supplies of pads or tampons, and instead leave the distribu-
tion of menstrual health products to individual prison officials.11 In states 
where legislation is not being considered or is unlikely to pass, a judicial rem-
edy is the only hope for incarcerated women seeking adequate menstrual hy-
giene.12 This issue is made even more pressing by the fact that the vast majori-
ty of incarcerated women are held in state prison.13 
Two constitutional amendments have the power to provide relief to incar-
cerated women: the Fourteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment.14 The 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from 
denying their citizens equal protection of the law on the basis of sex.15 The 
Eighth Amendment forbids states from engaging in cruel and unusual punish-
ment, including the denial of necessary medical care.16 This Note explores the 
requirements of each of these amendments and evaluates the validity of consti-
tutional challenges to the practice of restricting access to menstrual health 
products in prison.17 Part I discusses the current state of access to menstrual 
health products in prison, as well as the potential health problems that result 
from inadequate access to these products.18 Part II outlines the constitutional 
framework of the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments and discusses how each 
                                                                                                                           
 10 Aleks Kajstura, Women’s Mass Incarcerations: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON POL’Y INITIA-
TIVE (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019women.html [https://perma.cc/
44SK-5EJU] (noting that the majority of prisoners are held in state prisons). 
 11 Taylor Walker, The Dehumanizing Effects of Inadequate Access to Menstrual Products in Prisons 
and Jails, WITNESSLA (Nov. 17, 2019), https://witnessla.com/due-to-inadequate-access-to-menstrual-
products-periods-in-prison-can-be-stigmatizing/ [https://perma.cc/RZJ8-L45Q] (discussing the current 
status of access to menstrual health products in prison and its effect on incarcerated women). 
 12 See Samantha Michaels, Jail Is a Terrible Place to Have a Period. One Woman Is on a Cru-
sade to Make It Better., MOTHER JONES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/
2019/02/jail-california-tampons-menstruation-paula-canny-sanitary-pads/ [https://perma.cc/868H-
TUHE] (discussing a lawsuit filed in a California state court arguing that California’s current practice 
of restricting access to menstrual health products violates the Equal Protection Clause and Due Pro-
cess Clause of the California Constitution). 
 13 Kajstura, supra note 10 (discussing the breakdown of women in local, state, and federal pris-
ons). 
 14 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting “cruel and unusual punishment”); id. amend. XIV 
(mandating equal treatment under the law). 
 15 Id. amend. XIV, § 1; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) (establishing 
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits differential treatment on the basis of sex unless the treat-
ment is substantially related to an important government interest). 
 16 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (establishing 
that failure to provide necessary medical care may violate the Eighth Amendment if the harm is suffi-
ciently severe and the prison officials exhibited deliberate indifference). 
 17 See infra notes 23–371 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 23–65 and accompanying text. 
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amendment is applied in the prison context.19 Part III analyzes the constitutional-
ity of restricting access to tampons and pads in prison under the Equal Protection 
Clause and concludes that the practice is an unconstitutional facial classification 
on the basis of sex.20 Finally, Part IV analyzes the constitutionality of these re-
strictions under the Eighth Amendment, and argues that many prisons violate the 
Eighth Amendment by exposing women to an unreasonable risk of future harm 
by denying access to menstrual health products.21 This Note seeks to emphasize 
that pursuing a judicial remedy is important to ensure that women in every state 
are able to receive the menstrual health products they need.22 
I. MENSTRUAL HEALTH IN PRISON 
On any given day, more than 2.2 million people are incarcerated in Amer-
ica’s prisons and jails.23 Approximately 231,000 of those 2.2 million people are 
women.24 Although women constitute only a small percentage of the total pris-
on count, women’s prison populations have grown at a significantly higher rate 
than men’s prison populations in recent decades.25 In fact, women are now the 
fastest-growing population within the prison system.26 As a result, women’s 
health within the prison system is a growing concern.27 Section A of this Part 
discusses the varying levels of access to menstrual health products in prison 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See infra notes 66–194 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 195–332 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 333–371 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 195–371 and accompanying text. 
 23 Drew Kann, 5 Facts Behind America’s High Incarceration Rate, CNN (Apr. 21, 2019), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/28/us/mass-incarceration-five-key-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/
VP7T-YTC9] (providing statistics on incarceration in the United States and discussing why incarcera-
tion rates are so high). Jails are used for holding criminal defendants prior to trial or sentencing as 
well as those with short sentences. Michelle Mark, Felicity Huffman Was Just Sentenced to 14 Days 
Behind Bars. Here’s the Difference Between a Jail and Prison Sentence, INSIDER (Sept. 13, 2019), 
https://www.insider.com/difference-between-jail-and-prison [https://perma.cc/D45V-UWP4]. Con-
versely, prisons hold those who have been sentenced to a longer prison term, generally more than a 
year. Id. 
 24 Kajstura, supra note 10. Of these 231,000 incarcerated women, approximately 101,000 are in 
local jails, 99,000 are in state prisons, 16,000 are in federal prisons, 7,700 are in immigration deten-
tion centers, and 6,600 are in youth detention centers. Id. 
 25 Wendy Sawyer, The Gender Divide: Tracking Women’s State Prison Growth, PRISON POL’Y 
INITIATIVE (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/women_overtime.html [https://perma.
cc/G2B8-E3QP] (analyzing data trends regarding prison populations and discussing the growing issue 
of women in prison). Although the overall prison population has declined since 2009, men have dis-
proportionately benefitted from this decline. Id. Over the past four decades, the number of women in 
prison has increased by 834% whereas the number of men in prison has increased by less than half of 
that number. Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 See Witte, supra note 4 (discussing the growing campaign, spearheaded by the #MeToo 
movement, to encourage state legislators to require free and unrestricted access to pads and tampons 
in prison). 
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across states and counties.28 Section B then illustrates how prisons limiting 
access to menstrual health products jeopardizes imprisoned women’s health.29 
A. Access to Menstrual Health Products 
Because many prisons promulgate their own policies in the absence of 
controlling state legislation, access to menstrual health products in prisons var-
ies significantly across states and counties.30 In some prisons, women can ac-
cess pads on their own as needed, free of charge.31 But in the majority of pris-
ons, correctional officers are responsible for distributing free pads.32 Tampons 
are almost never provided for free in state prisons and prisoners must instead 
purchase them at the commissary.33 
In states and counties where women are only permitted to receive a cer-
tain amount of pads per month, the number of pads provided is often insuffi-
cient.34 Doctors recommend that women change their pads every four to eight 
hours throughout their menstrual cycles, but jails that limit access to pads pro-
vide, on average, only ten pads per month.35 Given that a typical cycle lasts 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See infra notes 30–55 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 56–65 and accompanying text. 
 30 See Walker, supra note 11 (describing how policies differ across various jurisdictions). Ap-
proximately thirteen states have introduced legislation that would require prisons to provide access to 
menstrual health products free of charge. Id. In these states, prison officials must comply with the 
laws and therefore do not maintain discretion over when to distribute products. See id. In the remain-
ing thirty-seven states, however, prison officials retain significant discretion over the distribution of 
menstrual health products, including what products to carry, what may be provided for free, and how 
many products each inmate may receive. Id. 
 31 Lauren Shaw, Note, Bloody Hell: How Insufficient Access to Menstrual Hygiene Products 
Creates Inhumane Conditions for Incarcerated Women, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 475, 478 (2019) (ana-
lyzing access to menstrual health products in prison and arguing that current practices violate human 
decency). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Shaw, supra note 31, at 479 (noting that pads and tampons are available for purchase at the 
commissary); Francine Barchett, Pads in Prison: Addressing Gender Disparities in New York State, 
ROOSEVELT INST. (2017), https://www.scribd.com/document/349869206/Pads-in-Prisons-Addressing-
Gender-Disparities-in-New-York-State [https://perma.cc/RB9V-ZDAK] (summarizing the current 
state of access to menstrual health products in New York and providing policy solutions). Tampons 
are now provided for free in federal prisons under the First Step Act. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 
No. 115-391 § 611, 132 Stat. 5194, 5274. State prisons have not explicitly stated why pads are pro-
vided for free instead of tampons, despite the fact that many women prefer using tampons. Barchett, 
supra (noting that more than 40% of women prefer using tampons over pads). A difference in price 
could account for this discrepancy. Jeanne Mah, Ladies, Here’s How Much Your Period Costs You 
Over Your Lifetime, DOLLARS & SENSE (June 27, 2019), https://dollarsandsense.sg/ladies-heres-
much-period-costs-lifetime/ [https://perma.cc/3NUK-9FSC] (noting that pads cost approximately 
$0.24 each, whereas tampons cost approximately $0.33 each). 
 34 Barchett, supra note 33. 
 35 See Shaw, supra note 31, at 484 (providing doctor recommendations for switching out pads and 
tampons during menstrual cycles); Barchett, supra note 33 (describing jail restrictions to pad and 
tampon access).  
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five to seven days, women can only change their pads every twelve to seven-
teen hours under this distribution scheme.36 Moreover, because many women 
wear multiple pads at once to avoid bleeding through their uniforms, they are 
often only able to change their pads once per day or, in some cases, once every 
other day.37 The problem of insufficient access to menstrual health products is 
particularly pronounced for women who experience longer periods or heavier 
flows.38 Some states do allow women to receive extra pads if they submit a 
doctor’s note, but the appointment to get that note costs, on average, $3.47 and 
is unaffordable for many incarcerated women.39 
The access problem is exacerbated by the fact that the criteria for how 
and when officers may provide pads differs significantly among prisons where 
the correctional officers are responsible for distributing free pads.40 Where 
there are no set limits on the quantity of pads that must be provided to inmates, 
correctional officers have discretion to provide inmates with as many pads as 
the inmate requires.41 But even in prisons where there is technically unlimited 
access, correctional officers still retain control of distribution, presenting seri-
ous issues for women.42 For instance, many correctional officers use this pow-
                                                                                                                           
 36 See Shaw, supra note 31, at 484.  
 37 See Barchett, supra note 33 (establishing that prisons provide women with, on average, only 
ten pads per month); Michaels, supra note 12 (discussing how women must wear multiple pads to 
avoid bleeding through their uniform because of how thin the pads are).  
 38 See Barchett, supra note 33 (acknowledging that some women have a heavier menstrual flow 
or a longer period than others). 
 39 Wendy Sawyer, The Steep Cost of Medical Co-pays in Prison Puts Health at Risk, PRISON 
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/19/copays/ [https://
perma.cc/S69D-DHAF]. The average minimum wage in prisons is $0.14 per hour. Id. Therefore, a 
prisoner who makes minimum wage would have to work more than twenty-five hours to afford a 
copay to see a doctor. Id. Only eight states do not require prisoners to pay a copay to see a doctor. Id. 
Out of the remaining forty-two states, copays range from $2.00 to $8.00. Id. Therefore, the number of 
hours needed to work to afford a doctor’s appointment varies from state to state. Id. For example, in 
South Dakota, a doctor’s appointment costs only $2.00 and prisoners make $0.25 per hour, so it only 
takes eight hours of work to afford a doctor’s appointment. Id. Comparatively, a doctor’s appointment 
in West Virginia costs $5.00 but prisoners only make $0.04 per hour, so it takes 125 hours of work to 
afford an appointment. Id. 
 40 See Shaw, supra note 31, at 478 (discussing various policies on how to distribute menstrual 
health products); Michaels, supra note 12 (examining the status of access to menstrual health products 
in California prisons). 
 41 Shaw, supra note 31, at 478 (explaining how some states and individual prisons have a policy 
of providing inmates with as many pads as needed). 
 42 See Bozelko, supra note 9 (discussing problems stemming from allowing correctional officers 
to distribute menstrual health products, even when officers are permitted to distribute an unlimited 
amount). Correctional officers may use menstrual health products as a means of control over the in-
mates, including by denying access to “disfavored” women and providing extra products to those who 
are in the officers’ good graces. Id. Correctional officers occasionally treat the pads or tampons as a 
reward to be earned, rather than a right. Id. This results in a social hierarchy in the prison that may 
undermine prison cohesion and safety in its own right, as well as potentially makes women disfavored 
by guards unable to access menstrual health products. Id. 
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er over prisoners as a means of controlling inmate behavior, and, in some in-
stances, even “charge” women sexual favors to receive pads.43 
And regardless of how pads in prisons are distributed, the provided pads 
are generally of such poor quality that women are unable to use them effective-
ly.44 The pads are generally wingless and low-absorbency.45 As a result, wom-
en often need to wear multiple pads to avoid bleeding through their uniforms.46 
Women who bleed through may be subject to disciplinary action.47 Others may 
be forced to wear their soiled uniform for up to a week before they are allowed 
to exchange their dirty laundry for clean clothing.48 
Although some women may purchase tampons at the commissary to 
augment their supply of free, low-quality pads, prices are often inflated such 
that many women are unable to afford them.49 The average commissary charg-
es $0.56 per tampon, whereas tampons are available on Amazon.com for as 
low as $0.19 per tampon.50 In many states, prison jobs are completely un-
paid.51 And in states where prisoners are paid for their work, the average min-
imum wage worker makes $0.14 per hour.52 Thus, an inmate making minimum 
wage would need to work sixty-four hours in order to afford a sixteen-count 
box of tampons.53 Because women are advised to change their tampons every 
                                                                                                                           
 43 Memorandum from Jocelyn Samuels, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., to the Honorable Robert 
Bentley, Governor of Ala. 14–15 (Jan. 17, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/
legacy/2014/01/23/tutwiler_findings_1-17-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/MC25-T69X]. In 2014, the Civil 
Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) launched an investigation into the 
Julia Tutweiler Prison for Women in Alabama. Id. at 1. In a memorandum summarizing its findings, 
the DOJ noted that prison staff had a history of sexual abuse and harassment against prisoners. Id. The 
investigation revealed that women frequently had to “barter” with prison guards to receive necessities, 
including menstrual health products, which led to coerced sexual acts. Id. at 14–15. Although Tutwei-
ler was aware of these abuses, the administration failed to remedy them or adequately discipline those 
responsible for the abuse. Id. at 19. As a result, the DOJ concluded that Tutweiler violated the Eighth 
Amendment by neglecting to protect its prisoners from the abuse and harassment caused by its correc-
tional staff. Id. at 1. 
 44 Shaw, supra note 31, at 478–79. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Michaels, supra note 12. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Semelbauer v. Muskegon Cty., No. 1:14-CV-1245, 2015 WL 9906265, at *8 (W.D. Mich. 
2015) (considering a prisoner’s claim that failure to provide access to menstrual health products com-
bined with the laundry schedule constituted an Eighth Amendment violation). 
 49 Michaels, supra note 12. 
 50 Id. Prison commissaries tend to inflate the prices of many goods in addition to tampons. Kate 
Wheeling, Are Prison Commissaries Fair?, PAC. STANDARD (May 30, 2018), https://psmag.com/
social-justice/are-prison-commissaries-fair [https://perma.cc/5NQ5-5NVV]. For example, a bottle of 
shampoo costs up to $1.69 for prisoners in Illinois while the same shampoo costs only $0.99 at a su-
permarket. Id. Commissary sales in prison net approximately $1.6 billion per year, with the average 
prisoner spending approximately $950 per year at the commissary. Id. 
 51 Shaw, supra note 31, at 480. 
 52 Sawyer, supra note 39. 
 53 See id. 
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four hours, a sixteen-count box of tampons would not carry many women 
through one cycle.54 For indigent prisoners, this means they are often unable to 
even work enough hours to afford tampons at the commissary.55 
B. Health Risks of Current Practices 
In response to their inability to access adequate menstrual health prod-
ucts, women in prison must often improvise to manage their periods.56 Women 
have reported rolling up toilet paper or pads to make their own tampons.57 
Other women remove mattress stuffing from their bedding to use as tampons.58 
Still others use unwashed rags as pads or tampons.59 
These practices, among others, jeopardize women’s health in both the short 
and long term.60 Leaving a tampon inserted for too long or using unsanitary 
items as makeshift tampons may result in toxic shock syndrome.61 This risk is 
magnified by the fact that many items used to make tampons are difficult to re-
                                                                                                                           
 54 See id. 
 55 See id. 
 56 Shaw, supra note 31, at 481; Rachel Baye, State Lawmakers Seek to Give Tampons to Prisoners, 
WYPR (Feb. 13, 2018), http://wypr.org/post/state-lawmakers-seek-give-tampons-prisoners [https://
perma.cc/TW3L-SCZL] (discussing Maryland’s legislative efforts to provide female inmates with free 
tampons). 
 57 Shaw, supra note 31, at 481. 
 58 Baye, supra note 56. 
 59 Shaw, supra note 31, at 481. 
 60 See id. at 480–84 (outlining negative health consequences of poor menstrual hygiene in prison). 
 61 Michaels, supra note 12. Toxic shock syndrome is a life-threatening condition caused by bacte-
rial infections. Toxic Shock Syndrome, MAYO CLINIC (May 4, 2017), https://www.mayoclinic.org/
diseases-conditions/toxic-shock-syndrome/symptoms-causes/syc-20355384 [https://perma.cc/D47B-
A36A]. Toxic shock syndrome can result in high fever, low blood pressure, vomiting or diarrhea, 
confusion, muscle aches, and headaches. Id. Toxic shock syndrome progresses rapidly and, if left 
untreated, can lead to a number of complications potentially resulting in death or permanent disability. 
Id. Although the overall prevalence of toxic shock syndrome is low, the majority of cases are the re-
sult of poor menstrual health. Adam Ross & Hugh W. Shoff, Toxic Shock Syndrome, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO. (June 22, 2019), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK459345/ [https://
perma.cc/4D7Z-E5RP]. Some people are more susceptible to toxic shock syndrome than others. Ra-
chel Nussbaum, Here’s What Really Happens if You Leave a Tampon in for Too Long, GREATIST 
(Sept. 4, 2019), https://greatist.com/live/tampon-toxic-shock [https://perma.cc/5H82-SSCX]. For 
example, some women can develop toxic shock syndrome after leaving a tampon inserted for just 
eight hours, whereas other women can leave a tampon inserted for over twelve hours without any 
adverse side effects. Id. The likelihood of developing toxic shock syndrome depends on individual 
risk factors, which can be impossible to know ahead of time. See id. (noting that the risk of developing 
toxic shock syndrome increases with heightened levels of staph bacteria, itself a health condition of 
which many women are unaware). But, it is clear that the longer a tampon or object is left inserted, the 
higher the risk of developing toxic shock syndrome. Jessie Gill, What Happens if I Keep a Tampon in 
for Longer Than Eight Hours?, VICE (July 28, 2017), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ywg8j5/
what-happens-if-i-keep-a-tampon-in-for-longer-than-8-hours [https://perma.cc/JR8G-XWCX]. 
2020] Restricting Access to Menstrual Health Products in Prison 2549 
move.62 If toxic shock syndrome is not promptly and adequately treated, it can 
require a hysterectomy and may result in sepsis or death.63 Furthermore, wearing 
the same pad for a prolonged period of time can lead to serious bacterial infec-
tions.64 Even prisoners who avoid short-term health dangers still face long-term 
health effects, as women who practice poor menstrual healthcare over a long 
period of time are at a significantly heightened risk of cervical cancer.65 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS IN PRISONERS’ RIGHTS LITIGATION 
The 2.2 million adults in the United States living behind bars are not 
stripped entirely of their constitutional rights just because they have been con-
victed of a crime.66 Two constitutional provisions are relevant to the denial of 
menstrual health products in prison: the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Pro-
                                                                                                                           
 62 Victoria Law, A New Memo Orders Federal Prisons to Provide Tampons—But How Well Is It 
Being Followed?, REWIRE NEWS (Oct. 23, 2017), https://rewire.news/article/2017/10/23/new-memo-
orders-federal-prisons-provide-tampons-well-followed/ [https://perma.cc/HUS8-5FZZ].  
 63 Id. (discussing a 2017 memo from the Bureau of Prisons requiring all federal prisons to provide 
menstrual health products). A hysterectomy is a surgery to remove the uterus, which results in infertil-
ity. Hysterectomy, AM. C. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS (Oct. 2018), https://www.acog.org/
patient-resources/faqs/special-procedures/hysterectomy [https://perma.cc/E7T4-K8XZ]. Sepsis is a 
life-threatening response to a prolonged infection. What Is Sepsis?, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/sepsis/what-is-sepsis.html [https://perma.cc/
67L7-B258]. Sepsis may result in a high heart rate, confusion, extreme pain, fever, and shortness of 
breath. Id. If left untreated, sepsis can lead to tissue damage, organ failure, and death. Id. 
 64 Shaw, supra note 31, at 484. 
 65 Jennifer Weiss-Wolf, America’s Very Real Menstrual Crisis, TIME (Aug. 11, 2015), http://
time.com/3989966/america-menstrual- crisis/ [https://perrma.cc/PTE2-VW5R] (discussing the current 
state of access to menstrual health products in America, as well as the negative effects of poor men-
strual health). Cervical cancer occurs within the cells of the cervix. Cervical Cancer, MAYO CLINIC 
(July 31, 2019), https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/cervical-cancer/symptoms-causes/
syc-20352501 [https://perma.cc/RR68-2RMQ]. Approximately 34% of women who are diagnosed 
with cervical cancer die within five years of their diagnosis. Survival Rates for Cervical Cancer, AM. 
CANCER SOC’Y (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.cancer.org/cancer/cervical-cancer/detection-diagnosis-
staging/survival.html [https://perma.cc/2KV5-AUPP].  
 66 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) (establishing the standard for constitutional violations 
within prisons); Kann, supra note 23 (noting that there are approximately 2.2 million people in Amer-
ican prisons). The Supreme Court has noted that prisoners retain all rights except those that are re-
moved through lawful process, either explicitly or by necessity of incarceration. See Procunier v. 
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 422–23 (1994) (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that a prisoner “retains all 
the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him 
by law” (quoting Coffin v. Richard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944))), overruled on other grounds 
by Thornburgh v. Abbot, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). For example, prisoners retain most of the rights pro-
vided by the Bill of Rights, albeit in a more limited state than others. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 
U.S. 294, 296 (1991) (noting that inmates retain rights protected by the Eighth Amendment); O’Lone 
v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (stating that inmates retain their First Amendment right to free-
dom of religion); Turner, 482 U.S. at 84 (recognizing that inmates retain their First Amendment right 
to freedom of expression and their Fourteenth Amendment right to marry); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 
817, 822 (1977) (holding that prisoners have a Fourteenth Amendment right to access the courts); Lee 
v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333–34 (1968) (noting that prisoners have a Fourteenth Amendment 
right to be free from racial discrimination).  
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tection Clause and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unu-
sual punishment.67 
Section A of this Part discusses the constitutional standards of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.68 It first reviews the stand-
ards for a prima facie equal protection case and then outlines two standards of 
scrutiny upon which lower courts rely: intermediate scrutiny and the 1987 Su-
preme Court Turner v. Safley standard.69 Section B then discusses the constitu-
tional standards of the Eighth Amendment.70 It first focuses on the test applied 
to Eighth Amendment claims based on denial of medical care and then outlines 
precedent that evaluates the relationship between personal hygiene items and 
the Eighth Amendment.71 
A. Equal Protection Clause 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that 
“nor shall any state . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.”72 Accordingly, the government cannot treat certain classes 
of people differently from other similarly situated people unless it can show 
that its action serves a legitimate governmental interest.73 In the landmark 
                                                                                                                           
 67 See infra notes 72–193 and accompanying text; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive 
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”). 
 68 See infra notes 72–135 and accompanying text. 
 69 See infra notes 72–135 and accompanying text. 
 70 See infra notes 136–194 and accompanying text. 
 71 See infra notes 136–194 and accompanying text. 
 72 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 73 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (establishing that the government 
cannot discriminate on the basis of race unless the action is narrowly tailored to a compelling state 
interest), abrogated on other grounds by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); see also, Jillian R. 
Friedmann, Note, A Girl’s Right to Bare Arms: An Equal Protection Analysis of Public-School Dress 
Codes, 60 B.C. L. REV. 2547, 2550 n.27 (2019) (outlining equal protection jurisprudence under the 
Fourteenth Amendment). Courts subject distinctions made on the basis of suspect classifications, such 
as race and national origin, to a higher form of scrutiny, referred to as strict scrutiny. See Korematsu, 
323 U.S. at 216 (noting that racial classifications are “immediately suspect” and subject to “the most 
rigid scrutiny”). Under strict scrutiny, classifications will be deemed unconstitutional unless the clas-
sifications are narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Ryan James & Jane Zara, 
Equal Protection, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 5–6 (2002) (outlining Supreme Court equal protection 
jurisprudence). Classifications that are “quasi-suspect,” such as sex, are subject to intermediate scruti-
ny, which requires a regulation to be substantially related to an exceedingly persuasive government 
interest. Id. at 8–9; see also infra notes 77–109 (discussing intermediate scrutiny in the context of sex 
discrimination claims). Classifications based on qualities that are not suspect, such as income or disa-
bility, receive the lowest form of scrutiny, also known as rational basis review. See, e.g., City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (holding that intellectual disability is not 
a suspect or quasi-suspect class and therefore does not warrant a heightened level of scrutiny); San 
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 25 (1973) (holding that socioeconomic status is 
not a suspect classification and therefore not subject to strict scrutiny analysis). 
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1971 case Reed v. Reed, the Supreme Court found that sex was a quasi-suspect 
class under the Equal Protection Clause and therefore would subject sex-based 
classifications to heightened scrutiny.74 Accordingly, individuals who believe 
that the government has treated them differently based on their sex may chal-
lenge the government’s actions in federal court.75 
1. Establishing a Prima Facie Case 
To establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause based on sex dis-
crimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the act was carried out by a 
government official, (2) he or she was treated differently because of his or her 
sex, and, in some circumstances, (3) that the government actor intended the act 
to differentiate on the basis of sex.76 The first requirement—that the act be car-
ried out by a state official—is key because the Fourteenth Amendment applies 
only to governmental action. Unless a plaintiff can establish that the govern-
ment official carried out the act in question, the claim will fail.77 Both local 
and state government officials are considered “state actors” and therefore any 
                                                                                                                           
 74 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (holding that a law that mandates preferring men over 
women in naming an administrator of an estate is unconstitutional because it makes a distinction 
based solely on stereotypes about sex). “Quasi-suspect” is a term used to describe classes which the 
court has found deserving of a heightened level of scrutiny, but not the more stringent strict scrutiny. 
James & Zara, supra note 73, at 8. Although sex is the most well-known quasi-suspect class, illegiti-
mate children and children of undocumented immigrants are also considered quasi-suspect classes. Id.  
 75 See Reed, 404 U.S. at 74 (holding in favor of a plaintiff who challenged sex discrimination by 
the state in federal court). A person who believes he or she was subject to discrimination on the basis 
of sex is permitted to sue state actors under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(2019) (“Every person who, under color of any statute . . . of any State . . . subjects . . . any citizen of 
the United States . . . to the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities of the United States Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . .”). To file a § 1983 suit, 
the plaintiff must first establish that the responsible actor was acting in his or her official capacity as a 
state official. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989). The plaintiff must also 
establish that the official acted “under the color of state law,” meaning the actor was empowered by 
the state and acted under the authority of the state. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988). Next, the 
plaintiff must establish that the actor violated a right under federal law, which includes constitutional 
rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Maine v. Thiboutot, 
448 U.S. 1, 5 (1980). Plaintiffs who satisfy these elements may obtain legal relief, or a monetary 
award, as well as equitable relief, such as an injunction. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at 
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 723 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 76 James & Zara, supra note 73, at 3. 
 77 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). The Civil Rights Cases established that the 
constitution only prohibits “[s]tate action of a particular character,” but not “[i]ndividual invasion of 
individual rights.” Id. The Supreme Court thus created a distinction between “private wrong[s],” 
which are not governed by the Constitution, and “state actions,” which are subject to the Constitution. 
Id. at 17. This concept is commonly referred to as the state action doctrine and, although it was formu-
lated in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, has been applied to all constitutional protections. 
Hala Ayoub, The State Action Doctrine in State and Federal Courts, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 893, 893 
n.2 (2017) (explaining the development and application of the state action doctrine). 
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laws or regulations promulgated by such officials, including prison officials, 
may be considered state action.78 
Next, plaintiffs must establish that the government officials treated them 
differently because of their sex.79 Plaintiffs can establish discriminatory treat-
ment in two ways.80 First, they can show that the law facially classifies based 
on sex, meaning it explicitly mandates that men and women be treated differ-
ently.81 Alternatively, plaintiffs can demonstrate government officials treated 
them differently because of their sex by showing that a facially neutral law was 
either applied in a discriminatory manner or imposed a disparate impact.82 
When plaintiffs assert a Fourteenth Amendment violation based on a the-
ory of discriminatory enforcement or disparate impact, they must also prove 
                                                                                                                           
 78 1 IVAN E. BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY § 1:15 n.4 (2019) (explaining the constitutional standards under the Four-
teenth Amendment and how they are applied to § 1983 claims). 
 79 Reed, 404 U.S. at 75–76. 
 80 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) (evaluating a claim of sex discrimina-
tion based on a law that facially classified on the basis of sex); Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 
493 (1977) (considering a claim of racial discrimination based on a law that had a disparate impact on 
Mexican-Americans); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (evaluating a claim of racial 
discrimination based on a law enforced by the government in a discriminatory manner against Chi-
nese-Americans). 
 81 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532. The State of Virginia ran a public university, called the Virginia 
Military Institute, that only admitted men. Id. at 520. In its 1996 decision, United States v. Virginia, 
the Supreme Court determined that Virginia’s policy facially classified based on sex. Id. at 519. The 
court subjected the policy to intermediate scrutiny, and ultimately held it unconstitutional because the 
government failed to demonstrate that the policy was substantially related to an exceedingly persua-
sive and important government interest. Id. at 534. 
 82 Casteneda, 430 U.S. at 493 (examining a claim of racial discrimination based on a neutral law 
that had a disparate impact); Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373–74 (examining a claim of racial discrimination 
based on a neutral law that was enforced in a discriminatory manner). Discriminatory enforcement of 
a neutral law occurs when officials use their discretion to enforce a law against members of one group, 
but not the other. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373–74. In Yick Wo, the City of San Francisco passed a law 
requiring permits for any resident operating a laundry in a wooden structure. Id. at 368. Following the 
passage of the law, two hundred Chinese-Americans applied for permits, but none were approved. Id. 
at 374. Conversely, the eighty non-Chinese individuals who applied for permits were all approved. Id. 
Although the law itself was facially neutral, the Supreme Court found that the city, nonetheless, vio-
lated the Fourteenth Amendment by enforcing the law in a discriminatory manner. Id. 373–74. The 
Supreme Court held that when a neutral law is applied unequally among similarly situated people, the 
government violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Id. Similarly, a neutral 
law imposes a disparate impact when it disproportionately burdens one group more than another. 
Casteneda, 430 U.S. at 493. 
 In Casteneda v. Partida, the plaintiff alleged that the state’s policy for selecting a grand jury 
violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights because, despite the fact that 79.1% of the county was 
Mexican-American, only 39% of people called for a grand jury over an eleven-year period were Mex-
ican-American. Id. at 495. The Supreme Court found that the statistical evidence alone established 
prima facie evidence of a Fourteenth Amendment violation. Id. at 496. In this way, the Court accepted 
disparate impact as a basis for an equal protection claim. See id. The statistics proved disparate impact 
because the state grand jury selection policy, despite being facially neutral, had the effect of burdening 
Mexican-Americans by disproportionately excluding Mexican-American jurors. Id. 
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that the law was enacted “because of, not merely in spite of,” its discriminatory 
effect.83 Consequently, the plaintiff must prove that the state actor intended the 
law to have a disparate impact or purposefully enforced the law in a discrimi-
natory way.84 Absent such intent, the state action will not be subject to a 
heightened level of scrutiny and will instead be evaluated under the deferential 
rational basis standard.85 
The court does not need to find invidious motive to infer intent.86 Thus, a 
state actor can intentionally discriminate against a particular class even if he or 
she is not motivated by a desire to harm that class.87 Instead, the key inquiry is 
                                                                                                                           
 83 Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). The Supreme Court in 1979, in 
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, considered the constitutionality of a state statute 
that required all civil service positions to give preference to veterans. Id. at 262. The plaintiffs claimed 
that the preference violated the Equal Protection Clause because it imposed a disparate impact on 
women given that very few women were veterans. Id. at 270. The Court upheld the statute as constitu-
tional because, although it benefitted men over women, it did not show an intentional decision to 
discriminate on the basis of sex. Id. at 281. The Court determined that intent is a necessary element of 
an equal protection claim based on disparate impact because “the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees 
equal laws, not equal results.” Id. at 273. Such a showing is not required, however, for laws that fa-
cially classify. See id. 
 84 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 256, 265 (1977) (“Proof of 
racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.”). In 1977 in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., the 
Supreme Court identified a non-exhaustive list of factors that courts may consider in determining 
whether discriminatory intent is present. Id. at 266. These factors include: (1) the historical back-
ground predating the decision; (2) the specific sequence of events leading to the challenged classifica-
tion; (3) the presence or absence of departure from normal procedure; (4) the legislative history of the 
action, including statements made by decisionmakers; and (5) the extent of the disparate impact, in-
cluding whether there exists a clear pattern that can only be explained by animus. Id. at 267–68. 
 85 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). In its 1976 opinion Washington v. Davis, the 
Supreme Court was concerned that, if disparate impact or discriminatory enforcement were sufficient 
to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim without the need to establish intent, it would potentially inval-
idate a host of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that benefit certain groups 
over others. Id. at 248. Therefore, the Supreme Court determined that, although evidence of disparate 
impact and discriminatory enforcement is not irrelevant, “it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious 
. . . discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.” Id. at 242. 
 Both strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny are considered heightened levels of scrutiny. See 
supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing heightened scrutiny standards). The proper level of 
heightened scrutiny depends on the characteristic upon which the law discriminates. See supra note 73 
and accompanying text. Unlike both strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny, a rational basis of re-
view standard only requires that the law is “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” City of 
Cleburne, 472 U.S. at 440. 
 86 BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra note 78, § 1:15 (noting that the “intent” element of a Four-
teenth Amendment violation is satisfied when a state intentionally differentiates between members of 
a protected class, regardless of its motive for doing so). 
 87 See, e.g., Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 459 F.3d 676, 694 (6th Cir. 
2006) (noting that there can be “an intent to treat two groups differently” even when there is not “an 
intent to harm”); Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 778 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]here can be intentional discrimination without an invid-
ious motive.”); United States v. Sch. Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530, 535 (8th Cir. 1975) (noting that 
the Fourteenth Amendment does not require an intent to harm, but rather an intentional differentia-
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whether the state actor intended to differentiate between classes.88 But, even if 
a plaintiff is able to demonstrate that a decision was motivated in part by dis-
criminatory intent, a court may still uphold the law if the state can prove that 
the same decision would have resulted had the impermissible purpose not been 
considered.89 
2. Applying the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny 
Once the plaintiff states a prima facie case, the court will determine the 
proper level of scrutiny to apply.90 Notably, there is no consensus regarding 
what level applies to claims of sex discrimination in prisons.91 Outside of the 
prison context, however, state action found to discriminate on the basis of sex 
is subject to intermediate scrutiny because of sex’s status as a quasi-suspect 
class.92 Yet, in 1987 in Turner, the Supreme Court stated that constitutional 
                                                                                                                           
tion); Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (stating that courts do 
not require “ill will, enmity, or hostility” in order to find intentional discrimination (quoting Ferrill v. 
Parker Grp., Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 472–73 n.7 (11th Cir. 1999))).  
 88 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 444–46 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that a prison 
doctor impermissibly considered race when he refused to administer a particular drug to a black pris-
oner because studies found the drug had not been successful on black men despite the fact that his 
driving motivation was the prisoner’s well-being); Hassan v. City of New York, 803 F.3d 277, 294–98 
(3d Cir. 2015) (holding that surveillance schemes targeting Muslim Americans were intentional dis-
crimination, despite the fact that the surveillance was motivated by a desire to increase public safety 
rather than a desire to burden Muslims). 
 89 See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (concluding 
that a school did not violate the Constitution when it fired a teacher after the teacher engaged in pro-
tected First Amendment speech). Although the protected speech was a substantial part of the school’s 
decision to fire the teacher, the school could have reached the same decision even if it did not consider 
the teacher’s views. Id. When asserting this defense, the government must demonstrate that the per-
missible considerations were influential at the time and not simply a post-hoc justification. Hunter v. 
Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (rejecting a state’s argument that events that occurred between 
the enactment of a statute and the court case justified the statute because the original motivation for 
enacting the statute was discriminatory). 
 90 Friedmann, supra note 73, at 2550–51 n.27. 
 91 See, e.g., May v. Sheahan, 226 F.3d 876, 882 (7th Cir. 2000) (articulating the Turner standard 
as the appropriate test for equal protection claims in the prison context); Quinn v. Nix, 983 F.2d 115, 
118 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying the Turner test to an equal protection claim regarding a hair length regu-
lation); Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 574 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that the Turner standard 
applies to equal protection claims, despite the fact that it was established based on a First Amendment 
claim); Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a 
sex-based equal protection claim in prison); Ashann-Ra v. Virginia, 112 F. Supp. 2d 559, 570 (W.D. 
Va. 2000) (finding that intermediate scrutiny should apply to sex discrimination in prison because 
Turner did not state that all rights in the prison context are subject to its standard); Klinger v. Neb. 
Dep’t of Corr., 824 F. Supp. 1374, 1388 (D. Neb. 1993) (finding that intermediate scrutiny, rather 
than the Turner test, is the proper test for equal protection claims based on sex in the prison context), 
overruled on other grounds by 31 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 92 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (noting that distinctions based on sex are only constitutional if they 
substantially relate to important government interests, and thus satisfy an intermediate scrutiny in-
quiry). 
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violations in prisons are to be upheld whenever the violation is “reasonably 
related to valid penological interests.”93 Thus, the Turner standard articulated a 
lower standard than intermediate scrutiny.94 
The Supreme Court has never considered whether the Turner standard or 
intermediate scrutiny applies to equal protection claims based on sex discrimina-
tion within prisons,95 and lower courts are split as to which test to apply.96 Until 
the Supreme Court addresses the issue, the test for equal protection claims based 
on sex discrimination will differ by jurisdiction.97 This Section details the two 
approaches lower courts have taken to address sex discrimination claims in the 
prison context.98 Subsection A will review intermediate scrutiny as it is applied 
to sex discrimination.99 Subsection B will outline the origins of the Turner 
standard and how courts have applied it to equal protection claims.100 
a. Intermediate Scrutiny 
Intermediate scrutiny is applied in all cases of sex-based discrimination 
outside of the prison context.101 To survive intermediate scrutiny, the state must 
prove that its discriminatory action is substantially related to an important gov-
ernment interest that is exceedingly persuasive.102 Although what constitutes 
an important government interest is subject to judicial interpretation, the Su-
preme Court has been more likely to find that distinctions based on bona fide 
biological differences between the sexes, such as the ability to become preg-
nant, serve an important government interest.103 Conversely, the Supreme 
Court has been reluctant to find interests based on sex stereotypes to be im-
                                                                                                                           
 93 Turner, 482 U.S at 89. 
 94 Id.; see infra notes 110–135 and accompanying text (providing an in-depth explanation of the 
standard articulated in Turner and the Supreme Court’s reasoning for establishing this standard). 
 95 1 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 5:15 (5th ed. 2019). 
 96 See supra note 91 and accompanying text (illustrating how courts vary in their application of 
the Turner standard). 
 97 See supra note 91 and accompanying text (collecting lower court cases that apply the Turner 
test and lower court cases that apply intermediate scrutiny). 
 98 See infra notes 101–135 and accompanying text. 
 99 See infra notes 101–109 and accompanying text. 
 100 See infra notes 110–135 and accompanying text. 
 101 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532–33. 
 102 Id. at 534. 
 103 See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 65 (2001). In 2001 in Nguyen v. INS, the Supreme 
Court upheld a law that imposed additional requirements for proving parental status on men which did 
not apply to women. Id. at 60. In doing so, the Court recognized that there was an important govern-
ment interest in ensuring there was a meaningful relationship between the parent and the child, and 
noted that a woman’s ability to become pregnant and eventually give birth ensured the requisite mean-
ingful relationship. Id. at 65. Therefore, the law was based on bona fide biological differences be-
tween the sexes that related to an important government interest and consequently satisfied intermedi-
ate scrutiny. Id. 
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portant government interests.104 Administrative convenience, such as govern-
mental efficiency and cost effectiveness, may never constitute an important 
government interest.105 
For a state action to be substantially related to its government purpose, 
the action must be a genuine attempt to achieve the stated objective, which 
may not be fabricated or invented post-hoc.106 Furthermore, actions are not 
substantially related to a stated government purpose if they are underinclusive, 
meaning they fail to regulate activities that pose fundamentally the same threat 
to the government’s interests.107 Similarly, actions that are overinclusive because 
the government could achieve the same result via less intrusive means will also 
fail the inquiry.108 If the state action is unable to survive intermediate scrutiny, 
the action will be deemed unconstitutional and therefore invalidated.109 
                                                                                                                           
 104 Friedmann, supra note 73, at 2554 n.49 (collecting cases where the Supreme Court has been 
hesitant to find that sex stereotypes constituted an important government interest). A sex stereotype is 
a preconceived notion about how an individual should behave or present based on his or her sex. 
Bridget Miller, What Is Sex Stereotyping?, HR DAILY ADVISOR (June 22, 2017), https://hrdaily
advisor.blr.com/2017/06/22/what-is-sex-stereotyping/ [https://perma.cc/QH8K-9S2Q]. 
 105 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973). In its 1973 decision Frontiero v. Richard-
son, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute that permitted servicemen to claim their wives as de-
pendents without proof of actual dependency but required servicewomen to prove actual dependency 
in order to claim the same benefit from their husbands. Id. at 678–79. In doing so, the Court rejected 
the government’s assertion that administrative efficiency and convenience justified such a distinction. 
Id. at 690. The Supreme Court noted that a law which differentiates based on sex for the sole purpose 
of administrative convenience is arbitrary and unconstitutional. Id.  
 106 Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233 (relying on the circumstances that existed at the time the contested 
action occurred, and declining to consider circumstances following the contested action, in order to 
determine whether the action was discriminatory). 
 107 City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52 (1994). In 1994 in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, the Su-
preme Court considered a First Amendment challenge to a law that prohibited displaying residential 
signs, except for signs that satisfied one of ten statutory exemptions. Id. at 45. In considering the con-
stitutionality of the city’s action, the Court noted that the presence of the ten exemptions made the law 
underinclusive. Id. at 51. The Court determined that the regulation was not closely related to the gov-
ernment’s interest in reducing clutter because, by providing so many exemptions, the government 
failed to regulate activities that posed the same fundamental threat of increased clutter. Id. at 52–53. 
 108 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004). In its 2004 decision Ashcroft v. ACLU, the Su-
preme Court considered a First Amendment challenge to the Child Online Protection Act, which crim-
inalized obscene speech on the internet. Id. at 661. To determine whether the law was narrowly tai-
lored to achieve the government’s interest in protecting children on the internet, the court asked 
whether the law was “the least restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.” Id. at 666. 
The plaintiffs identified blocking and filtering software as an available, effective alternative to the 
statute. Id. at 666–67. The Court then considered the viability of the stated alternative, as well as 
whether the alternative would be less restrictive than the law in question. Id. The Court reasoned that 
the law could not survive Constitutional muster because the state failed to demonstrate that blocking 
software would be less effective than the regulation. Id. at 670.  
 109 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534. 
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b. The Turner Standard 
In 1987, the Supreme Court in Turner articulated a substantially lower 
standard than intermediate scrutiny.110 In Turner, the Court considered the con-
stitutionality of two prison restrictions.111 The first restriction prohibited in-
mates from corresponding via mail with other inmates at a separate correction-
al institution absent special permission.112 The plaintiffs claimed that this re-
striction violated their First Amendment right to free speech.113 The second 
restriction prohibited inmates from getting married during their period of in-
carceration absent a “compelling reason,” such as an illegitimate pregnancy or 
childbirth.114 The plaintiffs claimed that this restriction violated their funda-
mental right to marry under the Fourteenth Amendment.115 
In considering these questions, the Supreme Court confirmed that prison-
ers are not stripped of all constitutional protections upon entering prison.116 
The Court acknowledged, however, that judges are not well-versed in the 
unique challenges of running a prison and determined that a significant amount 
of deference must be afforded to prison officials.117 Therefore, rather than 
evaluating the plaintiffs’ claims under strict scrutiny—the normal constitution-
al standard for laws abrogating fundamental rights—the Supreme Court held 
that “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the 
                                                                                                                           
 110 Turner, 482 U.S. at 81; see also Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 514 (2005) (referring to 
the test designed in Turner as “the Turner standard”). 
 111 Turner, 482 U.S. at 81. 
 112 Id. at 81–82. Inmates were only permitted to correspond with inmates in other facilities if (1) 
the other inmates were immediate family members, (2) the correspondence concerned legal matters, or 
(3) prison officials believed that permitting correspondence would be in the best interest of the in-
mates. Id. Yet, in practice, the District Court for the Western District of Missouri found that the rule 
effectively made it so that inmates could not write to non-family members. Id. at 82. 
 113 Id. at 93. The Court ultimately determined that the correspondence regulations did not violate 
the inmates’ First Amendment rights because the regulation was reasonably related to a valid correc-
tional goal: institutional security. Id. 
 114 Id. at 82. 
 115 Id. at 83. In Zablocki v. Redhail, the Supreme Court established that the right to marry is a 
fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 434 U.S. 374, 398 (1978). The Court in 
Turner acknowledged that the right to marry is still afforded to inmates, but may be subject to addi-
tional restrictions, similar to other rights that are limited when incarcerated. Turner, 482 U.S. at 95. 
Nonetheless, the Court found the regulation unconstitutional because it was not reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests. Id. at 97. The court supported this decision by noting that the regula-
tion was more restrictive than necessary to achieve institutional security. Id. at 97–98. The fact that 
there were “obvious, easy alternatives” to the regulation that would respect the inmates’ rights while 
imposing a minimal burden on the prison’s objectives further persuaded the Court. Id. at 98. 
 116 Turner, 482 U.S. at 84 (“[F]ederal courts must take cognizance of the valid constitutional 
claims of prison inmates. Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protec-
tions of the Constitution.” (citations omitted)). 
 117 Id. at 84–85. 
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regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological inter-
ests.”118 
To evaluate whether a prison regulation satisfies the Turner standard, the 
Supreme Court instructed lower courts to consider four factors.119 First, courts 
should determine whether there is a valid, rational, and neutral connection be-
tween the regulation in question and governmental interests.120 Legitimate 
governmental interests within the prison context include security and safety, 
prisoner rehabilitation, and conservation of resources.121 If this first factor is 
not satisfied, many lower courts will end the inquiry and find for the plaintiff-
prisoner.122 The second factor asks whether inmates are provided alternative 
ways to exert their rights.123 If prisoners are provided with such alternatives, 
                                                                                                                           
 118 Id. at 89. At a minimum, legitimate penological interests include the safety of prisoners and 
staff, rehabilitation, and crime prevention. Shabazz, 482 U.S. at 348. Although the Supreme Court has 
not designed an exact test for determining whether a stated penological interest is legitimate, it is clear 
that the Court provides substantial deference to prison officials in determining such interests. See 
generally Jennifer N. Wimsatt, Note, Rendering Turner Toothless: The Supreme Court’s Decision in 
Beard v. Banks, 57 DUKE L.J. 1209, 1224 (2008) (discussing the level of deference to prison officials 
in post-Turner Supreme Court cases).  
 119 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90. 
 120 Id. at 89. Under this first prong of the test, courts will require prisons to articulate why the 
restriction furthers a valid penological interest. MUSHLIN, supra note 95, § 2:5. The reason must be 
genuine rather than manufactured. Id. Although prison officials have significant discretion to deter-
mine how to run a prison, they cannot offer justifications that are “arbitrary, exaggerated and pre-
textual.” Williams v. Lane, 851 F.2d 867, 875 (7th Cir. 1988); see, e.g., Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 
353, 363 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting a policy as insufficiently related to the prison’s interest that required 
prison guards to open legal mail outside of the presence of prisoners, despite the fact that the prison 
was concerned the mail could contain anthrax); Conyers v. Abitz, 416 F.3d 580, 585 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(determining that a deadline for Ramadan participation may not be related to penological interest 
when a deadline was not imposed for other religious observations); Aiello v. Litscher, 104 F. Supp. 2d 
1068, 1082 (W.D. Wis. 2000) (rejecting a prison regulation that prohibited access to sexually explicit 
material because, although the prison had an interest in promoting security and rehabilitation, the 
regulation was overly broad and therefore not reasonably related to the penological interest). 
 121 Shabazz, 482 U.S. at 348 (“The limitations on the exercise of constitutional rights arise both 
from the fact of incarceration and from valid penological objectives—including deterrence of crime, 
rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security.”); see also MUSHLIN, supra note 95, § 2:5. 
 122 MUSHLIN, supra note 95, § 2:9. 
 123 Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. The Supreme Court has yet to provide guidance as to whether lower 
courts should look for particular alternative means or generic alternative means. MUSHLIN, supra note 
95, § 2:6. A lower court searching for particular alternative means will ask if the prison offers a way 
for the prison to engage in the specific protected activity burdened by the regulation. Id. Comparative-
ly, a court following the generic alternative means approach would ask if prisoners had other ways to 
exercise the right at issue, regardless of whether they could engage in the exact activity in question. Id. 
For example, in the 1989 case Whitney v. Brown before U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 
Jewish prisoners claimed that the prison violated their First Amendment rights when it prohibited 
them from congregating for Passover service. 882 F.2d 1068, 1069 (6th Cir. 1989). The Sixth Circuit 
followed the particular alternative means approach and asked if there were other reasonable ways for 
prisoners to observe Passover. Id. at 1073. The Sixth Circuit ultimately found that the restriction vio-
lated the prisoners’ First Amendment rights in part because the prison did not provide an alternative 
means for the prisoners to celebrate Passover. Id. at 1077. Had the Sixth Circuit in Whitney utilized 
the generic alternative means approach, it would have asked whether the prisoners had other ways to 
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the court will be more likely to uphold the regulation in question.124 Third, 
courts are instructed to consider the “ripple effect” that accommodating the 
right in question would have on the institution, including the effect on other 
inmates, correctional officers, and government resources.125 Finally, courts 
inquire as to whether there are obvious and easy alternatives to the regulation 
that would have a de minimis effect on government interests while accommo-
dating the inmates’ rights.126 The burden is on the plaintiff, rather than the 
state, to articulate valid alternatives.127 
Although the Supreme Court articulated the Turner standard in the con-
text of First Amendment and due process claims, the plain language of the de-
cision implies that the test applies to all constitutional claims by prisoners.128 
In 2005, however, the Supreme Court undermined this implication in Johnson 
v. California.129 In Johnson, the Court held that the Turner test is not the prop-
er standard for equal protection claims based on racial discrimination in pris-
on.130 Rather, the Court decided that such claims should be evaluated under the 
                                                                                                                           
practice Judaism, even if they were not permitted to observe Passover. See MUSHLIN, supra note 95, 
§ 2:6 (discussing the distinction between the particular alternative means approach and the generic 
alternative means approach). Assuming the prison permitted the prisoners to practice Judaism in other 
respects, such as through observing the Sabbath or keeping kosher, the court may have come out dif-
ferently under the generic alternative means approach. See id. 
 124 MUSHLIN, supra note 95, § 2:6. 
 125 Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. If a court finds that the ripple effect of accommodating a prisoner’s 
constitutional rights would be significant and undesirable, it should uphold the prison’s restriction. Id. 
One common negative ripple effect asserted by prisons is jealousy; prisons are often concerned that 
institutional security will be compromised if prisoners are permitted to engage in certain rights be-
cause other prisoners will be jealous that some people are receiving special treatment. See, e.g., Daw-
son v. Scurr, 986 F.2d 257, 260–61 (8th Cir. 1993) (reasoning that a regulation permitting inmates 
who are “psychologically fit” to view pornographic materials could have an undesirable ripple effect); 
Pella v. Adams, 723 F. Supp. 1394, 1396 (D. Nev. 1989) (recognizing that a policy permitting prison-
ers to purchase alternative drug tests could have a negative ripple effect because not all prisoners can 
afford alterative drug tests). 
 126 Turner, 482 U.S. at 90–91. See, e.g., Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d 896, 905 (9th Cir. 2001) (es-
tablishing that it would be a de minimis alternative for prison guards to distinguish between junk mail 
and magazine subscriptions); Williams v. Bitner, 359 F. Supp. 2d 370, 379 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (finding 
that there was a de minimis alternative to disciplining a Muslim inmate for refusing to prepare pork 
because the prison could have removed the inmate from his job), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 455 
F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 127 Turner, 482 U.S. at 91. 
 128 See id. at 89. In articulating the Turner standard, the Supreme Court stated that, “when a pris-
on regulation impinges on an inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably 
related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. A plain reading of the phrase “an inmates’ constitu-
tional rights” seems to imply that the stated standard applies to all constitutional rights, not just the 
First Amendment right at issue in Turner. See id. 
 129 Johnson, 543 U.S. at 509. 
 130 Id. In its 2005 opinion Johnson v. California, the Court considered whether the practice of 
automatically rooming new inmates with other inmates of the same race violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 502. The Court determined that “[t]he right not to be 
discriminated against based on one’s race is not susceptible to the logic of Turner.” Id. at 510. Rather, 
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strict scrutiny analysis used to assess claims of racial discrimination outside 
the prison context.131 The Court reasoned that equal protection claims based on 
race warrant strict scrutiny, rather than the less stringent Turner standard, be-
cause the right to be free from racial discrimination does not conflict with 
proper prison administration.132 The Court found the strict scrutiny test forgiv-
ing enough to allow prison officials to effectively run safe prisons while pro-
tecting prisoners’ rights.133 Therefore, despite the apparently all-inclusive lan-
guage of the Turner decision, the Supreme Court carved out at least one excep-
tion where the Turner standard does not apply to a prison regulation that in-
fringes on an inmate’s constitutional rights.134 The Supreme Court, however, 
has never considered whether there should be a similar exception for equal 
protection claims based on sex discrimination.135 
B. Eighth Amendment Protections 
In addition to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Eighth Amendment can be used to evaluate whether it is constitutional to 
restrict access to menstrual health products in prison.136 The Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits the government from inflicting “cruel and unusual punish-
ments” on convicted prisoners.137 The Eighth Amendment requires prisons to 
                                                                                                                           
such claims should be evaluated under the strict scrutiny analysis used for all other claims of racial 
discrimination. Id. at 509. 
 131 Id. Strict scrutiny requires a showing that the regulation in question is narrowly tailored to fit a 
compelling government interest. Friedmann, supra note 73, at 2550; see also supra note 73 and ac-
companying text (describing the tiers of scrutiny employed in equal protection claims). 
 132 Johnson, 543 U.S. at 510. 
 133 Id. at 514. 
 134 Id. at 509. In 1968, the Supreme Court determined that de jure racial segregation in prisons 
was unconstitutional. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333 (1968) (per curiam). Nonetheless, in-
mates are quick to point out that de facto segregation is still alive and well in many prisons. See VIC-
TOR HASSINE ET AL., LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: LIVING IN PRISON TODAY 69 (3d ed. 2004) (“An in-
mate’s race may still determine where he can stand, sit, or work, and what he can say and to whom he 
may speak.”); JEFFREY IAN ROSS & STEPHEN C. RICHARDS, BEHIND BARS: SURVIVING PRISON 51 
(2002) (“With few exceptions, black prisoners associate with blacks, whites with whites, and Hispan-
ics with Hispanics.”). The Supreme Court has primarily concerned itself with de jure segregation, 
rather than de facto segregation. James E. Robertson, Separate but Equal in Prison: Johnson v. Cali-
fornia and Common Sense Racism, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 795, 803 (2006) (noting that, 
despite the holdings in Johnson and Lee, prisons are still racially segregated in practice). 
 135 MUSHLIN, supra note 95, § 5:15. 
 136 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting “cruel and unusual punishments”). 
 137 Id. The protections of the Eighth Amendment are extended to pretrial detainees as well. Wil-
liam H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Prison Conditions as Amounting to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 
51 A.L.R. 3d 111 § 2(a) (1973). Because a pretrial detainee has not yet been convicted of a crime, 
courts often find that practices intended to punish the detainee violate the detainee’s due process rights 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishments. Id. Therefore, any punishment that is cruel and unusual if imposed on 
a convicted prisoner is also cruel and unusual if imposed on a pretrial detainee. Id. But, not all pun-
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provide adequate medical care and certain personal hygiene articles for prison-
ers and could possibly extend to menstrual health products in particular.138 
1. Development of Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence 
Originally, the Eighth Amendment prohibited only torture and similarly 
violent methods of punishment.139 Over the years, however, the Supreme Court 
has found that the Eighth Amendment prohibits more than “physically barba-
rous punishment”; rather, it “embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, 
civilized standards, humanity, and decency.”140 The Supreme Court has devel-
oped a number of touchpoints for evaluating whether punishment is cruel and 
unusual.141 
First, courts consider punishments that are inherently cruel or barbaric to 
be cruel and unusual because they inflict unnecessary pain.142 In determining 
whether a punishment inflicts unnecessary pain, courts have considered mental 
and emotional distress in addition to physical suffering.143 Second, courts may 
consider sentences that are excessive or disproportionate to the crime alleged 
cruel and unusual.144 A punishment is often considered excessive if it bears no 
relation to legitimate penal objectives, such as deterrence, isolation, or reha-
bilitation.145 In making this determination, lower courts often have upheld 
practices upon which correctional institutes widely rely or are otherwise ac-
cepted by penologists.146 In contrast, courts often consider practices that pe-
                                                                                                                           
ishments that are cruel and unusual if imposed on a pretrial detainee will be considered cruel and 
unusual if imposed on a convicted prisoner. Id. 
 138 See, e.g., Semelbauer v. Muskegon Cty., No. 1:14-CV-1245, 2015 WL 9906265, at *9 (W.D. 
Mich. 2015) (providing for the possibility that denying access to menstrual health products could 
violate the Eighth Amendment under certain circumstances). 
 139 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). 
 140 Id. 
 141 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980) (“This Court has on occasion stated that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the severity 
of the crime.”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249–50 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (consider-
ing the discriminatory application of the death penalty as evidence that it is arbitrary and therefore 
unconstitutional); Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (holding that carrying out a sec-
ond execution attempt after the first execution attempt failed due to a mechanical error does not vio-
late the Eighth Amendment because the purpose was not to inflict unnecessary pain). 
 142 See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) (holding that handcuffing a prisoner to a 
hitching post for seven hours in the summer heat without access to water or a bathroom violated the 
Eighth Amendment because it caused an extreme and unnecessary amount of pain and suffering). 
 143 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (holding that the penalty of expatriation violates 
the Eighth Amendment, even though it does not involve physical suffering, because of the extreme 
mental distress that it may cause). 
 144 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 271 (noting that the Eighth Amendment requires that the severity of the 
sentence be roughly equivalent to the severity of the crime). 
 145 Danne, supra note 137, § 5(a).  
 146 Id.; see, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 192 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that solitary con-
finement does not violate the Eighth Amendment in part because this practice is widely used across 
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nologists have abandoned or rejected cruel and unusual.147 Third, punishments 
that are inflicted arbitrarily against some but not others may be considered cru-
el and unusual.148 Finally, a punishment can be cruel and unusual if modern 
society believes it to be abhorrent or unacceptable.149An Eighth Amendment 
violation may be based on a particular act of punishment or aggregate condi-
tions of confinement.150 Courts generally consider harsh or uncomfortable 
prison conditions an appropriate aspect of punishment, but prison conditions 
may not be so harsh as to be inhumane.151 
                                                                                                                           
the country and has been a disciplinary tool used in prisons for years); Glenn v. Wilkinson, 309 
F. Supp. 411, 415 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (holding that housing death sentence prisoners in a separate facili-
ty does not violate the Eighth Amendment in part because it is a widely accepted and utilized prac-
tice); Akamine v. Murphy, 238 P.2d 606, 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951) (holding that it was not cruel and 
unusual to prohibit an inmate from seeing his wife because the practice was long practiced in San 
Francisco prisons and approved by the Federal Bureau of Prisons). Penologists are experts in prison 
management and criminal punishment. Penology, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 147 Danne, supra note 137, § 5(a); see, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968) 
(holding that the use of corporal punishment in a prison violates the Eighth Amendment in part be-
cause public opinion opposed the practice and it had been abolished in nearly every other state penal 
system); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 647 (E.D. Va. 1971) (finding that imposing a bread 
and water diet on an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment in part because penologists widely disap-
proved of the practice); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 373 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (finding that the prac-
tice of using other inmates as prison guards violates the Eighth Amendment in part because it is “uni-
versally condemned by penologists” and was abolished in all but three states). 
 148 See Furman, 408 U.S at 249–50 (Douglas, J., concurring) (determining that the death penalty 
is unconstitutional in part because it is applied arbitrarily insofar as it is disproportionately and dis-
criminatorily imposed against poor people, black people, and other unpopular minorities). Justice 
Brennan echoed this same concept in his Furman concurrence where he stated that “the very words 
‘cruel and unusual punishments’ imply condemnation of the arbitrary infliction of severe punish-
ments.” Id. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 149 Id. at 277. The Court considers the social acceptability of a punishment as relevant insofar as 
“[r]ejection by society . . . is a strong indication that a severe punishment does not comport with hu-
man dignity.” Id. Judges, however, must be careful not to mistake their own viewpoint for that of 
society. Id. Thus, it is preferable to rely on objective standards of societal sentiments, rather than the 
judge’s own perception. Id. at n.21.  
 150 See, e.g., Owens-El v. Robinson, 442 F. Supp. 1368, 1379 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (finding that the 
combined effect of the prison’s failure to provide adequate beds, appropriate clothing, and facilities 
for personal hygiene violated the Eighth Amendment). Conditions of confinement include conditions 
formally imposed as a sentence for a crime, such as a judicial order to attend certain programming, as 
well as those that are not formally imposed, such as the cleanliness of the prison. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 
U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (noting that the Eighth Amendment “could be applied to some deprivations that 
were not specifically part of the sentence but were suffered during imprisonment”). In the 1991 Su-
preme Court case Wilson v. Seiter, the plaintiff alleged that the aggregate conditions of the prison, 
including “overcrowding, excessive noise, insufficient locker storage space, inadequate heating and 
cooling, improper ventilation, unclean and inadequate restrooms, unsanitary dining facilities and food 
preparation, and housing with mentally and physically ill inmates,” violated the Eighth Amendment. 
Id. at 296. The Supreme Court noted that such conditions, although not formally imposed as a part of 
his punishment, could still constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 297. 
 151 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (“To the extent that [prison] conditions are 
restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses 
against society.”); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 287 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[W]e can be certain that the 
Framers intended to proscribe inhumane methods of punishment.”). 
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2. Standard for Denial of Medical Care 
In 1976, the Supreme Court established in Estelle v. Gamble that “delib-
erate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnec-
essary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”152 
The Supreme Court recognized that needlessly denying medical care to in-
mates often results in unnecessary pain and suffering which cannot serve any 
legitimate penological purpose, and is therefore inconsistent with contempo-
rary standards of decency.153 Prisoners who claim an Eighth Amendment viola-
tion based on conditions that are not part of a formal punishment, including 
medical care, must satisfy a two-part test, containing both a subjective and ob-
jective component.154 The subjective component asks if the official exhibited 
deliberate indifference to the inmate’s wellbeing.155 The objective prong re-
quires the plaintiff to show that the medical need ignored by the official was 
sufficiently serious to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.156 
a. Deliberate Indifference 
To satisfy the subjective deliberate indifference prong, officials must have 
known that they were exposing a plaintiff to a significant risk of harm.157 This 
prong requires more than negligence but does not require purpose or 
knowledge that harm will occur.158 Accordingly, the standard is most often 
                                                                                                                           
 152 Estelle, 419 U.S. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). 
 153 Id. at 102–03. 
 154 Substantive Rights Retained by Prisoners, 48 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 1157, 1186 
(2019) (analyzing constitutional rights within prisons). Claims of Eighth Amendment violations based 
on formally imposed sanctions are evaluated under the multiple tests devised to determine whether a 
punishment is cruel and unusual. See supra notes 142–149 and accompanying text (explaining how 
courts approach Eighth Amendment claims). 
 155 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (evaluating a prisoner’s claim that the prison 
violated her Eighth Amendment rights when it failed to respond appropriately to her safety concerns 
by examining the prison’s subjective awareness of the threat to the prisoner’s safety). 
 156 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (evaluating whether a prisoner’s claim that prison 
guards used excessive force against him violated the Eighth Amendment by determining whether the 
excessive force resulted in serious injuries). 
 157 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (noting that deliberate indifference requires that “the official must be 
both aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 
exists, and he must also draw the inference”). Prison doctors as well as correctional officers can exhib-
it deliberate indifference. Estelle, 419 U.S. at 104. If a plaintiff claims that a doctor exhibited deliber-
ate indifference, the plaintiff must show that it goes beyond mere medical malpractice. Id. at 105–06. 
Without more, the conduct is not a wanton infliction of unnecessary pain and consequently cannot 
support an Eighth Amendment claim. Id. 
 158 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. The Court recognized that deliberate indifference requires more than 
mere negligence. Id. Yet deliberate indifference can be “satisfied by something less than acts or omis-
sions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id. Therefore, the 
Court found that “deliberate indifference [lies] somewhere between the poles of negligence at one end 
and purpose or knowledge at the other.” Id. at 836. Although many lower courts equated the “middle 
ground” between the poles with recklessness, the Supreme Court noted that recklessness can carry 
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equated with criminal recklessness, which occurs when an actor disregards a 
known risk even without knowing that the harm will actually occur.159 There-
fore, because actual knowledge of risk is required, prison officials cannot be 
held responsible for failure to perceive a significant risk even if the risk was 
obvious.160 Officials may, however, be held responsible for failing to act where 
they knew there was a serious risk of harm but believed the harm would not 
actually materialize.161 Prison officials may also escape liability if they take 
reasonable steps to ameliorate the risk, even if the harm still occurs.162 
To prove deliberate indifference, plaintiffs may rely on circumstantial ev-
idence.163 Accordingly, if a substantial risk is plainly obvious, a factfinder may 
conclude that the actor possessed the requisite knowledge.164 Prison officials 
may rebut the assertion that they were aware of an obvious risk but will still be 
held liable if they purposefully ignored or refused to investigate facts that they 
suspected to be true.165 The Supreme Court implied that this sort of “willful 
blindness” may be considered a form of deliberate indifference in its decision 
in 1994 in Farmer v. Brennan.166 
b. Serious Medical Need 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that only indifference towards seri-
ous medical needs may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.167 
Therefore, deprivations that do not implicate basic needs or are otherwise de 
                                                                                                                           
more than one definition. Id. Civil recklessness occurs when an individual acts, or fails to act, despite 
a substantial known or obvious risk. Id. Conversely, criminal recklessness occurs only when an indi-
vidual acts despite a substantial risk that is actually known to the individual. Id. at 836–37. 
 159 Id. at 836 (noting that lower courts frequently treat deliberate indifference as synonymous with 
recklessness). 
 160 Id. at 837. 
 161 Id. at 842. (“[A]n Eighth Amendment claimant need not show that a prison official acted or 
failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the official acted or 
failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.”). 
 162 Id. at 844. 
 163 Id. Circumstantial evidence refers to evidence that can be inferred from a situation, rather than 
directly observed. Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 146. 
 164 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. 
 165 Id. at 843 n.8. 
 166 See id. (“While the obviousness of a risk is not conclusive and a prison official may show that 
the obvious escaped him . . . he would not escape liability if the evidence showed that he merely re-
fused to verify underlying facts that he strongly suspected to be true, or declined to confirm inferences 
of risk that he strongly suspected to exist . . . .”). Willful blindness is defined as taking deliberate 
action to avoid confirming one’s suspicions that a crime occurred. Willful Blindness, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 146. 
 167 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (“In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or 
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only 
such indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of decency’ in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment.”). 
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minimis do not meet this standard.168 The Supreme Court has yet to articulate a 
test for evaluating what constitutes a serious medical need,169 but lower courts 
have devised a number of tests to evaluate whether an asserted medical need is 
sufficiently harmful.170 
Most lower courts focus on five factors to determine whether there is a 
serious medical need.171 These courts assess whether (1) a physician has de-
termined that the inmate’s condition requires treatment;172 (2) the condition is 
one that a typical lay person could recognize as requiring medical attention;173 
(3) the condition causes significant pain;174 (4) the condition inhibits the in-
mate’s daily acts;175 and (5) the condition threatens permanent handicap or 
loss.176 When evaluating these factors, courts only look to what officials knew 
at the time of the alleged violation.177 
                                                                                                                           
 168 Wilson, 501 U.S at 298. A deprivation is considered de minimis if it is “trifling” or “negligi-
ble” such that it is “so insignificant that a court may overlook it in deciding an issue or case.” De Min-
imis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 146. 
 169 MUSHLIN, supra note 95, § 4:4. 
 170 Estelle, 419 U.S. at 106; MUSHLIN, supra note 95, § 4:4. 
 171 MUSHLIN, supra note 95, § 4:4. 
 172 Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994) (“A serious medical 
need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment.”), overruled in part on 
other grounds by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002); Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, 923 F.2d 
203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that a medical need is sufficiently serious if a physician finds that it 
requires treatment). 
 173 Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997) (“A serious medical need is one that 
. . . is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” 
(quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 311 (D.N.H. 1977))); see also Riddle v. Mondrag-
on, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996) (same); Sheldon v. Pezley, 49 F.3d 1312, 1316 (8th Cir. 
1995) (same); Mahan v. Plymouth Cty. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1995) (same); Hill, 40 
F.3d at 1186 (same); Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(same). 
 174 Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the Eighth Amendment prohib-
its ignoring injuries if they are “sufficiently serious or painful to make the refusal of assistance uncivi-
lized”); Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150, 1154–55 (6th Cir. 1991) (“[A] prisoner who suffers pain 
needlessly when relief is readily available has a cause of action against those whose deliberate indif-
ference is the cause of his suffering.”); East v. Lemons, 768 F.2d 1000, 1001 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding 
that a prisoner-plaintiff stated a possible constitutional violation because he may have suffered “undue 
pain”). 
 175 Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702–03 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that one touchpoint for an 
Eighth Amendment violation is whether an individual has a medical condition that interferes with 
daily life); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1992) (same), overruled on other 
grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 176 Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 347 (“[W]here denial or delay causes an inmate to suffer a life-long 
handicap or permanent loss, the medical need is considered serious.”); see also Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of 
Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 785 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding that a ruptured shoulder tendon which resulted in 
permanent impairment was a serious medical need). 
 177 See, e.g., Davis v. Jones, 936 F.2d 971, 972–73 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that a small cut which 
ultimately resulted in a serious injury was not a serious medical need because a reasonable individual 
would not view a one-inch cut as high-risk). For this reason, officials are not responsible for condi-
tions that turn out to be objectively serious but initially appear innocuous. Id. 
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In addition to immediate harm, the Supreme Court has held that the 
Eighth Amendment also covers future harm to inmates if the harm is sufficient-
ly serious.178 In future harm case, plaintiffs must show only that they were ex-
posed to unreasonably high levels of harm likely to implicate serious medical 
needs in the future.179 When determining whether exposure to a risk of future 
harm violates the Eighth Amendment, courts look to the gravity of the potential 
harm as well as the statistical likelihood that the harm will materialize.180 Courts 
also assess whether society’s modern standards of decency tolerate the risk.181 
3. Personal Hygiene and the Eighth Amendment 
The Supreme Court has never considered whether denying a plaintiff ac-
cess to items for personal hygiene, such as menstrual health products, could 
constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.182 Lower courts, however, indicate 
that such a denial could form the basis for an Eighth Amendment claim if the 
denial poses a risk to an inmate’s physical health or safety.183 
For example, in 1978 in Owens-El v. Robinson, the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania found that a prison’s failure to 
provide essential personal hygiene items including toilet paper, clothing, and 
towels, violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment.184 The prison provided no process for indigent inmates to request 
                                                                                                                           
 178 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). The plaintiff in the Supreme Court’s 1993 deci-
sion Helling v. McKinney filed a § 1983 suit claiming the state violated his Eighth Amendment rights 
when it roomed him with an inmate who smoked cigarettes heavily and exposed him to secondhand 
smoke. Id. at 28. The Court determined that exposure to the secondhand smoke posed an unreasonable 
risk to his future health, which could form a basis for an Eighth Amendment claim. Id. at 35. 
 179 Id. at 34. 
 180 Id. at 36. 
 181 Id. To evaluate evolving standards of decency, the Court will often look to state and federal 
legislatures as well as sentencing juries. Matthew C. Matusiak et al., The Progression of “Evolving 
Standards of Decency” in U.S. Supreme Court Decisions, 39 CRIM. JUST. REV. 253, 257 (2014) (trac-
ing the history of how the Supreme Court analyzes and applies standards of decency in Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence). Additionally, courts will often look to prior judicial decisions as well as 
international and comparative law in evaluating evolving standards of decency. Id. at 259. Occasional-
ly, courts will consider their own judgment, principles of proportionality, and social science research 
to examine the standard. Id. 
 182 See James v. O’Sullivan, 62 F. App’x 636, 639 (7th Cir. 2003) (considering whether failure to 
provide personal hygiene items constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation in the absence of Supreme 
Court guidance); McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 369 (4th Cir. 1975) (same); Dawson v. Kendrick, 
527 F. Supp. 1252, 1288–89 (S.D.W. Va. 1981) (same); Owens-El, 442 F. Supp. at 1379 (same). 
 183 See, e.g., McCray, 516 F.2d at 369 (determining that a prison’s denial of certain personal hy-
giene items could violate the Eighth Amendment because of the risk to inmates of developing health 
issues without those items); see also infra notes 184–194 and accompanying text (discussing cases 
where lower courts considered whether denial of personal hygiene items violated the Eighth Amend-
ment). 
 184 442 F. Supp. at 1379. Historically, courts tended to evaluate Eighth Amendment claims by 
examining each allegedly violative deprivation independently. Danne, supra note 137, § 24. In recent 
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toilet paper when they could not afford it at the commissary, and the limited 
supply of bath towels forced some inmates to airdry.185 Therefore, the court 
found that the prison functionally deprived the inmates of necessary items, de-
spite the fact that the items were technically available to the inmates.186 Pos-
session of these articles was not a privilege, but rather a necessary entitlement 
under modern standards of decency, according to the court.187 
Similarly, in 1975 in McCray v. Burrell, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit found that a prison violated the Eighth Amendment 
when it failed to provide the inmate-plaintiff with personal hygiene items, in-
cluding soap, razors, toilet paper, and toothbrushes.188 And in 1981 in Dawson 
v. Kendrick, the United States District Court for the Southern District of West 
Virginia found that a prison’s denying access to items necessary for personal 
hygiene, such as soap, razors, combs, toothpaste, toilet paper, and pads, violat-
ed the Eighth Amendment.189 In reaching this conclusion, the court was partic-
ularly concerned with the fact that these denials could, and often did, result in 
prisoners developing parasitic skin conditions.190 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit expressed 
similar sentiments in 2003 in James v. O’Sullivan when it discussed the health 
                                                                                                                           
years, however, courts have moved towards an approach that considers the totality of the circumstanc-
es when determining whether the conduct rises to a level of cruel and unusual punishment. Id. 
 185 Owens-El, 442 F. Supp. at 1378. 
 186 Id. at 1384. Although the prison made bath towels available in the showers, there were not 
enough towels for each prisoner. Id. Therefore, inmates often could not receive a towel after their 
showers. 
 187 Id. at 1378. 
 188 516 F.2d at 369. The plaintiff in McCray v. Burrell was held in a mental observation cell be-
cause he displayed “mentally disturbed behavior.” Id. at 366. The mental observation cell did not 
contain a mattress or blanket and did not have anywhere to sit other than the concrete floor. Id. at 369. 
The cell did not contain a sink, and the toilet was a hole in the floor covered with feces and urine. Id. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that these conditions in the aggregate, 
combined with the denial of personal hygiene items, were a violation of the Eighth Amendment be-
cause no “decent society would tolerate it even for a suspected mental patient who had been convicted 
of a crime.” Id. 
 189 Dawson, 527 F. Supp. at 1288–89. The plaintiff in Dawson articulated several conditions that 
he alleged violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1258. In addition to the lack of personal hygiene 
articles, the plaintiff claimed that: the plumbing was inadequate and unsanitary; the lighting was too 
dim to read without suffering visual damage; poor housekeeping resulted in unsanitary living condi-
tions, there were too few sheriffs to adequately protect the prisoners; the prison was severely over-
crowded; the food did not satisfy prisoners’ nutritional needs; inmates were not permitted enough time 
to exercise; and the medical care was inadequate. Id. at 1287–1306. Unlike the court in McCray, the 
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia analyzed each of the plaintiff’s claims in 
isolation rather than in the aggregate. Id. Therefore, the court was able to find that the lack of access to 
personal hygiene items standing on its own violated the Eighth Amendment, without regard for the 
other conditions. Id. at 1289. 
 190 Id. at 1289 (“The resulting danger to the prisoners’ health is manifest in the parasitic skin 
conditions which often plague the prisoners. Defendants have not presented, nor is there otherwise 
apparent, any legitimate purpose served by this deprivation. The court therefore finds this condition to 
be violative of . . . the Eighth Amendment as to convicted prisoners.”). 
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risks associated with denying prisoners access to articles of personal hy-
giene.191 Accordingly, the court found that denial of soap, toothbrushes, and 
toothpaste could be a violation of the Eighth Amendment if the inmate could 
show that this deprivation could lead to an excessive health risk.192 Being de-
nied a comb, deodorant, and cleaning supplies, however, did not satisfy the 
objective prong of the Eighth Amendment test for the Seventh Circuit because 
these denials posed no serious threat to the plaintiff’s health.193 Therefore, 
many lower courts will find that denying access to personal hygiene items vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment only if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the deni-
al poses a serious risk to inmate health.194 
III. DENIAL OF MENSTRUAL HEALTH PRODUCTS AS AN  
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE VIOLATION 
No federal court has considered whether restricting access to menstrual 
health products violates the Equal Protection Clause.195 Courts have largely 
evaluated the issue under the Eighth Amendment without much analysis under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.196 
If a court were to consider a prison’s restriction of access to menstrual 
health products under the Equal Protection clause, it would first need to evalu-
ate whether the policy facially classifies on the basis or sex or, in the alterna-
                                                                                                                           
 191 James, 62 F. App’x at 639. 
 192 Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in James reviewed the United 
States District Court for the Central District of Illinois’s decision to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint 
for failure to state a claim. Id. at 638. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit only considered whether the 
plaintiff’s complaints could form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation without determining 
whether such a violation occurred. See id. 
 193 Id. at 639. The objective prong of the Eighth Amendment test requires an excessive risk to 
health or safety. Id. 
 194 See, e.g., id. (finding that denying inmates access to personal hygiene items that directly im-
plicated their health violated the Eighth Amendment); McCray, 516 F.2d at 369 (determining that 
preventing an inmate from brushing his teeth or bathing with soap violated the Eighth Amendment); 
Dawson, 527 F. Supp. at 1288–89 (holding that a prison’s denial of necessary hygiene items to in-
mates constituted an Eighth Amendment violation); Owens-El, 442 F. Supp. at 1379 (finding that 
failure to provide clothing, towels, and toilet paper violated the Eighth Amendment).  
 195 See Semelbauer v. Muskegon Cty., No. 1:14-CV-1245, 2015 WL 9906265, at *9 (W.D. Mich. 
2015) (challenging failure to provide menstrual health products on Eighth Amendment grounds, but 
not equal protection grounds); Atkins v. Cty. of Orange, 372 F. Supp. 2d 377, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(same); Dawson, 527 F. Supp. at 1288–89 (same). 
 196 See, e.g., Shaw supra note 31, at 491 (arguing that the practice of denying access to menstrual 
health products in prison could violate the Eighth Amendment without considering the issue under the 
Equal Protection Clause); Kate Walsh, Note, Inadequate Access: Reforming Reproductive Health 
Care Policies for Women Incarcerated in New York State Correctional Facilities, 50 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 45, 66 (2016) (arguing that New York’s policy of limiting access to menstrual health 
products in prison constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation without considering whether it could 
also violate the Equal Protection Clause). 
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tive, imposes a disparate impact on women.197 Next, a court would need to de-
termine whether intermediate scrutiny or the standard dictated in Turner v. 
Safley applies to sex-based equal protection claims in prison.198 Section A of 
this Part reviews relevant literature and court decisions that could impact a 
court’s application of the Equal Protection Clause to menstrual health in pris-
on.199 Section B then analyzes the likelihood of a successful sex-based equal 
protection claim.200 This Part concludes that an equal protection challenge 
would succeed under either intermediate scrutiny or the Turner standard so 
long as a court would be willing to accept menstruation-based classification as 
a form of sex-based classification.201 
A. Equal Protection and Menstrual Health in Prison 
Because inadequate access to menstrual health products in prison has 
never been examined under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is helpful and nec-
essary to turn to similar challenges for guidance.202 This Section considers 
what scholars and courts have said about the proper standard for evaluating 
sex-based classification claims within the prison context and whether menstru-
ation-based classification could be considered sex-based classification.203 
1. Unequal Treatment Based on Menstruation as a Form of Sex 
Classification 
Only those who are born biologically female are capable of menstruat-
ing.204 For this reason, scholars have argued that menstruation-based classifica-
                                                                                                                           
 197 See supra note 82 and accompanying text (explaining that a law can either facially discrimi-
nate on the basis of sex, or it can be facially neutral but impose a disparate impact on one sex). If a 
plaintiff establishes that the law facially discriminates, she has satisfied her prima facie case and the 
law will be evaluated under the appropriate level of scrutiny—either intermediate scrutiny or the 
Turner standard, depending on the jurisdiction. MUSHLIN, supra note 95, § 5:15. Alternatively, if a 
plaintiff demonstrates that the law is facially neutral but imposes a disparate impact on one sex, the 
plaintiff must prove that Congress passed the law because of its discriminatory effect, and not just in 
spite of it. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (establishing that a law will 
not be found in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment absent a showing of intent). 
 198 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see, e.g., Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450, 1455 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (considering whether the Turner standard or intermediate scrutiny should apply to 
claims of sex discrimination in prison); Ashann-Ra v. Virginia, 112 F. Supp. 2d 559, 570 (W.D. Va. 
2000) (same); Klinger v. Neb. Dep’t of Corr., 824 F. Supp. 1374, 1388 (D. Neb. 1993) (same), over-
ruled on other grounds by 31 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 199 See infra notes 202–266 and accompanying text. 
 200 See infra notes 267–332 and accompanying text. 
 201 See infra notes 267–332 and accompanying text. 
 202 See infra notes 204–242 and accompanying text. 
 203 See infra notes 204–266 and accompanying text. 
 204 See generally KAREN GRAVELLE, THE PERIOD BOOK: A GIRL’S GUIDE TO GROWING UP 
(2017) (explaining the biology behind menstruation). Note, though, that many transgender men as-
signed female at birth menstruate, yet transgender women cannot menstruate. Shazia Ahmad & Mat-
2570 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:2541 
tions are a form of facial sex classification or, at a minimum, impose a dispar-
ate impact on women.205 The Supreme Court, however, has never considered 
whether differential treatment on the basis of menstruation is a form of sex 
classification and few lower courts have offered guidance.206 The following 
subsections will analyze the strengths and challenges of litigating menstrua-
tion-based classifications under both a facial classification theory and a dispar-
ate impact theory.207 
a. Facial Classification 
One way to challenge restricted access to menstrual health products in 
prison is to claim that the practice constitutes facial sex classification.208 But 
                                                                                                                           
thew Leinug, The Response of the Menstrual Cycle to Initiation of Hormonal Therapy in Transgender 
Men, 2 TRANSGENDER HEALTH 176, 177 (2017). 
 205 Bridget J. Crawford & Emily Gold Waldman, The Unconstitutional Tampon Tax, 53 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 439, 472 (2019); see also Bridget J. Crawford & Carla Spivack, Tampon Taxes, Discrimina-
tion, and Human Rights, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 491, 496 (referring to taxes on menstrual hygiene prod-
ucts as “blatant gender discrimination”); Victoria Hartman, End the Bloody Taxation: Seeing Red on 
the Unconstitutional Tax on Tampons, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 313, 319 (2017) (arguing that taxation on 
menstrual hygiene products violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment be-
cause it imposes a disparate impact on women); Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Pregnancy and Sex 
Role Stereotyping: From Struck to Carhart, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1095, 1098 (2009) (arguing that the Su-
preme Court’s decisions demonstrate that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is connected to 
discrimination on the basis of sex). 
 206 See Crawford & Waldman, supra note 205, at 462–66 (discussing lower courts’ consideration 
of whether differential treatment on the basis of menstruation is a form of sex classification in the 
absence of Supreme Court guidance). In 2016, attorneys filed a class-action lawsuit against New York 
State alleging that a sales tax on menstrual health products violated the Fourteenth Amendment be-
cause it drew a classification based on sex that could not survive intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 461; see 
Seibert v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., No. 151800/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 3, 2016). Before 
the court could hear the complaint, New York repealed the tax and the court subsequently dismissed 
the case. Crawford & Waldman, supra note 205, at 462. Later that same year, attorneys filed a similar 
lawsuit against the State of Florida, but the court dismissed the lawsuit after Florida repealed the tax. 
Id. at 463–64; see Wendell v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 2016-CA-001526 (Fla. Leon County Ct. 
July 7, 2016). In 2019, California attorneys sued the state, the governor, and the administrator respon-
sible for administering a tax on menstrual health products, claiming that the tax violated the Four-
teenth Amendment. Crawford & Waldman, supra note 205, at 465. The court dismissed the claim 
against the state and the governor, finding that both were improper parties. Id. The court then granted 
the remaining defendant’s motion for summary judgment on procedural grounds and therefore did not 
issue a holding on the constitutionality of the tax. Crawford & Waldman, supra note 205, at 465–66. 
 207 See infra notes 208–242 and accompanying text.  
 208 See supra notes 72–85 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of a prima facie case 
for an equal protection claim). If a court determines that the prison regulations were not a form of sex-
based classification, the court would evaluate them under a rational basis of review rather than under 
intermediate scrutiny. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (explaining the tiers of scrutiny). 
Although it is possible to invalidate a law under rational basis review, it is rare as this level of review 
is very forgiving. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“The day is 
gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state 
laws . . . because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of 
thought.”). In order to satisfy rational basis review, the government only needs to demonstrate that the 
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many scholars believe that discrimination based on menstruation cannot be 
considered a form of sex-based facial classification under the precedent set by 
the 1974 Supreme Court decision Geduldig v. Aiello.209 In Geduldig, the Su-
preme Court found that excluding pregnancy from disability coverage did not 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment because legislation concerning pregnancy 
was not sex-based.210 The Supreme Court stated that laws classifying people 
based on pregnancy divided them into two groups: pregnant individuals and 
non-pregnant individuals.211 The Court ultimately determined that this division 
was not the same as dividing people based on sex because, although the former 
group is composed exclusively of women, the latter group included both men 
and women.212 Therefore, the Court concluded that differential treatment based 
on pregnancy was not a prohibited sex-based classification.213 
Those who believe that differential treatment based on menstruation is not 
a form a sex classification argue that, much like Geduldig, legislation based on 
menstruation divides people into two groups: those who menstruate and those 
who do not.214 Therefore, these scholars posit that, as with pregnancy, laws that 
differentiate based on menstruation cannot be considered sex-based discrimi-
nation.215 Under this view, legislation that differentiates based on menstruation 
would be evaluated under the more deferential rational basis standard of re-
view and not the heightened intermediate scrutiny standard.216 
Other scholars have suggested that the Supreme Court has moved beyond 
the reasoning in Geduldig based on the Court’s 2003 decision, Nevada De-
partment of Human Resources v. Hibbs, and its 2015 decision, Obergefell v. 
                                                                                                                           
law or regulation is “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
 209 See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974) (holding that distinctions based 
on pregnancy are not considered sex discrimination because, while all pregnant people are women, not 
all non-pregnant people are men), superseded by statute as stated in Newport News Shipbuilding & 
Dry Doc Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1998); John D. Nagy, Recent Developments, Geduldig v. Aiel-
lo, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 141, 143 (1975) (arguing that the logic in Geduldig forecloses the possibility 
that discrimination based on biological distinctions between the sexes will qualify as sex discrimina-
tion); Diane L. Zimmerman, Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the Defini-
tion of Sex Discrimination, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 441, 442 (1975) (same). 
 210 Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494, 496 n.20. 
 211 Id. at 496 n.20. 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id. at 494. 
 214 See Zimmerman, supra note 209, at 442 (discussing the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Geduldig as dividing people based on biological capabilities rather than sex).  
 215 See Nagy, supra note 209, at 143 (analyzing the reasoning of Geduldig and its impact on fu-
ture sex discrimination cases); Zimmerman, supra note 209, at 442 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Geduldig as dividing people based on pregnancy status rather than sex). 
 216 See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494 (determining that differential treatment based on pregnancy is 
not a form of sex-based discrimination because, although all pregnant people are women, not all non-
pregnant people are men). 
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Hodges.217 In Hibbs, the Supreme Court recognized that the Family and Medi-
cal Leave Act (FMLA) was a valid exercise of Congress’s enforcement powers 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.218 The Court noted that alt-
hough Congress cannot use its power to substantively enlarge rights guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment, it can use Section 5 to enact legislation to 
prophylactically prevent Fourteenth Amendment violations.219 The Court ulti-
mately held that the FMLA was a constitutional use of Congress’s powers be-
cause it sought to prophylactically prevent sex discrimination by ensuring that 
paternity leave benefits are equal to maternity leave benefits.220 Some scholars 
argue that the Court’s decision implied that preventing discrimination based on 
pregnancy is the same as preventing sex-based discrimination.221 Under this 
view, differential treatment based on pregnancy must be a form of sex-based 
discrimination because, if it were not, it would be an enlargement of Four-
teenth Amendment rights which could not be justified under Section 5.222 In 
this way, some argue that Hibbs abrogates the reasoning of Geduldig.223 
                                                                                                                           
 217 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015) (holding that laws prohibiting same-sex 
marriage violate the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735 (2003) (determining that the Family 
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) is a valid exercise of Congress’s powers under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment); Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494 (finding that discrimination based on pregnancy is not 
a form of sex discrimination).  
 218 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides Congress with the 
power to enact legislation necessary to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. For example, Congress has used Section 5 to pass the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act (ADA), which helped to ensure that individuals with disabilities receive equal protection 
under the law. Armstrong v. Wilson, 942 F. Supp. 1252, 1261 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (finding that the ADA 
was a valid exercise of congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). Congress 
has also used Section 5 to pass the Voting Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination in voting. Kat-
zenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646 (1966) (upholding the Voting Rights Act as constitutional 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 219 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 727–28 (noting that in the exercise of its Section 5 power, “Congress may 
enact so-called prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially constitutional conduct, in order to 
prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct” but may “not ‘attempt to substantively redefine the States’ 
legal obligations’” (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000))). 
 220 Id. at 735. The FMLA stated that “due to the nature of the roles of men and women in our 
society, the primary responsibility for caretaking often falls on women, and such responsibility affects 
the working lives of women more than it affects the working lives of men.” 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5) 
(2018). To remedy this, the FMLA required that companies ensure both paternity and maternity leave 
is available. Id. § 2601(b)(4)–(5). 
 221 See, e.g., Crawford & Waldman, supra note 205, at 471–72; Siegel & Siegel, supra note 205, 
at 1107. 
 222 Crawford & Waldman, supra note 205, at 471–72. 
 223 See, e.g., Siegel & Siegel, supra note 205, at 1107 (arguing that Hibbs abrogates the assertion 
in Geduldig that pregnancy has no relationship to sex discrimination). 
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Some scholars argue that the holding in Obergefell also demonstrated a 
shift away from the logic in Geduldig.224 In Obergefell, the Supreme Court 
held that states violated the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving same-sex 
couples the right to marry.225 Scholars have noted that, although Geduldig de-
termined pregnancy discrimination was not sex-based discrimination because 
not all women will become pregnant, Obergefell found a Fourteenth Amend-
ment violation despite the fact that many gay people will never marry.226 Based 
on this logic, some argue that unequal treatment based on menstruation is a 
form of sex-based discrimination despite the fact that not all women menstru-
ate, including prepubescent girls, postmenopausal women, or women with cer-
tain medical conditions.227 
b. Disparate Impact 
Other scholars assert that policies burdening those who menstruate violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment because such policies disparately impact wom-
en.228 Disparate impact occurs when a facially neutral law disproportionately 
burdens a particular group of people.229 Therefore, some argue that because 
only women menstruate, policies that burden people who menstruate have an 
unconstitutional, disparate impact on women.230 Disparate impact in the prison 
context is particularly noteworthy because women constitute 100% of those 
burdened by restrictions on menstrual health products in prison despite the fact 
that women only constitute approximately 7% of the prison population.231 
                                                                                                                           
 224 See, e.g., Crawford & Waldman, supra note 205, at 472 (arguing that Obergefell abrogates the 
reasoning in Geduldig); see also Obergefell, 576 U.S at 675 (invalidating laws that prohibited same 
sex marriage as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 225 Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 675. The plaintiffs in the 2015 Supreme Court case Obergefell v. 
Hodges challenged laws in several states that defined marriage as a union between one man and one 
woman. Id. at 653–54. The Court held that the laws violated the due process rights of the plaintiffs 
under the Fourteenth Amendment by abridging their fundamental right to marriage. Id. at 675. Alt-
hough the Court did not decide the case under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court expressed equal 
protection concerns by noting that “the Equal Protection Clause, like the Due Process Clause, prohib-
its this unjustified infringement of the fundamental right to marry.” Id. 
 226 Holning Lau & Hillary Li, American Equal Protection and Global Convergence, 68 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1251, 1263 (2017). 
 227 See, e.g., Crawford & Waldman, supra note 205, at 480–81 (discussing how the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Obergefell abrogates the reasoning in Geduldig because the Court in Obergefell 
was unconcerned with the fact that not all gay couples will become married, whereas the Court in 
Geduldig was concerned with the fact that not all women become pregnant). 
 228 Id. at 476–77. 
 229 Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493 (1977) (examining a claim of racial discrimination 
based on a neutral law that had a disparate impact); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 
(1886) (examining a claim of racial discrimination based on a neutral law that was enforced in a dis-
criminatory way); see also supra note 82 and accompanying text (defining disparate impact). 
 230 See, e.g., Crawford & Waldman, supra note 205, at 476–77. 
 231 Inmate Gender, FED. BUREAU PRISONS (Jan. 25, 2020), https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/
statistics_inmate_gender.jsp [https://perma.cc/BVY7-PDP5]. In Casteneda v. Partida, the Supreme 
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Therefore, some have asserted that an equal protection claim could be based on 
a theory of disparate impact.232 
Importantly, to succeed on disparate impact theory, advocates would need 
to demonstrate that prisons deny access to menstrual health products because 
of, and not merely in spite of, its negative effect on women.233 When the dis-
parate impact is severe enough, the extent of the disparate impact can be de-
terminative of intent.234 In 1977 in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp., the Supreme Court acknowledged that such cases 
are rare, but recognized at least two instances where the disparate impact was 
so severe that it determined intent.235 In the first instance, the Alabama State 
Legislature redrew a voting district to exclude nearly all black voters, and in 
the second instance, a local government provided all white citizens, but no 
Chinese citizens, business permits.236 In both of these cases, the Supreme 
Court found the disparate impact stark enough to support an inference of in-
tent.237 The current disparate impact on women in prison could be considered 
at least as striking as the disparate impact previously recognized by the Su-
preme Court and therefore support a finding of discriminatory intent.238 
Alternatively, some scholars argue that discriminatory intent could be es-
tablished based on the taboos surrounding menstruation that make menstrual 
health products generally disfavored in society.239 Finally, discriminatory intent 
                                                                                                                           
Court found the fact that Mexican-Americans only constituted 39% of grand jury summons, despite 
constituting 79.1% of the entire population, significant enough to support a disparate impact claim. 
430 U.S. at 495; see also supra note 82 (discussing the Supreme Court’s reasoning and holding in 
Casteneda). 
 232 Crawford & Waldman, supra note 205, at 476–77. 
 233 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279. 
 234 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 256, 266 (1977). 
 235 Id. 
 236 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960); Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374. In the 1886 Su-
preme Court case Yick Wo v. Hopkins, zero out of two hundred Chinese-Americans were provided 
laundering permits whereas eighty out of eighty white citizens were provided with permits. 118 U.S. 
at 374. In the Supreme Court’s 1960 case Gomillion v. Lightfoot, Alabama changed a voting district in 
a way that excluded 396 out of 400 black voters from the city without excluding any white voters. 364 
U.S. at 341. In both cases, the Supreme Court found the state acted with discriminatory intent. Id. at 
347; Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374. 
 237 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (noting that a disparate impact “as stark as that in Gomil-
lion or Yick Wo” could be determinative of intent). 
 238 See supra note 236 (describing the official acts in Yick Wo and Gomillion that the Supreme 
Court found had an unconstitutional, disparate impact on a distinct population). The disparate impact 
on women could be considered just as blatant as that in Yick Wo and Gomillion because only women 
are negatively affected by restrictions on menstrual health products, just as only Chinese people were 
affected by the enforcement in Yick Wo and only black people were affected by the redistricting in 
Gomillion. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (noting that women make up one hundred per-
cent of the inmates affected by policies that restrict access to menstrual health products); see also 
Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341; Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374. 
 239 Crawford & Waldman, supra note 205, at 478–79. Taboos surrounding menstruation date as 
far back as ancient Greece, where it was thought that women’s wombs traveled through their bodies 
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could also be inferred from the lack of compelling policy goals driving re-
strictions on menstrual health products; courts are generally more likely to find 
intent where there is not a larger policy goal driving the regulation.240 These 
scholars contend that imposing policies against those who menstruate does not 
further any policy goals aside from saving money, which can be achieved 
through many alternative means.241 Therefore, some argue that, despite the 
seemingly high bar, it is possible to prove that policies burdening access to 
menstrual health products show discriminatory intent.242 
2. Intermediate Scrutiny Versus the Turner Standard 
Although no court has decided what standard of review should be applied 
to the issue of access to menstrual health products in prison, several courts 
have considered the proper standard of review for other equal protection 
claims brought by inmates.243 Lower courts are split on whether intermediate 
scrutiny or the Turner standard applies to sex-based equal protection claims 
within the prison context.244 Courts that hold the Turner standard applies rely 
on the plain language of Turner, which states that “when a prison regulation 
impinges on an inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is rea-
sonably related to legitimate penological interests.”245 Conversely, courts that 
apply intermediate scrutiny maintain that the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision 
discussing a prisoner’s race-based equal protection claim, Johnson v. Califor-
                                                                                                                           
and caused disease. Ada McVean, The History of Hysteria, MCGILL U. OFF. FOR SCI. & SOC’Y (July 
31, 2017), https://www.mcgill.ca/oss/article/history-quackery/history-hysteria [https://perma.cc/
CZX4-BMF2]. Physicians at this time believed that menstrual blood caused “female problems,” in-
cluding anxiety, depression, and other psychological disorders. Id. In the late nineteenth century, the 
theory was that women suffered from “hysteria,” a “medical explanation for everything that men 
found mysterious or unmanageable in women.” Id. Today, premenstrual syndrome is often viewed by 
men as a debilitating condition that renders women largely incompetent. Crawford, supra note 205, at 
508. Ironically, tampons are currently taxed as “luxury items” rather than medical necessities despite 
the dominating view that menstruation is a debilitating condition. Id. at 504. 
 240 Crawford & Waldman, supra note 205, at 480. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. at 476. 
 243 See, e.g., May v. Sheahan, 226 F.3d 876, 882 (7th Cir. 2000) (articulating the Turner standard 
as the appropriate test for equal protection claims in the prison context); Quinn v. Nix, 983 F.2d 115, 
118 (8th Cir. 1993) (same); Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 574 (2d Cir. 1990) (same); Pitts, 
866 F.2d at 1455 (same); Ashann-Ra, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 570 (considering whether the Turner stand-
ard or intermediate scrutiny should apply to claims of sex discrimination in prison); Klinger, 824 
F. Supp. at 1388 (same). 
 244 See supra note 91 and accompanying text (illustrating how courts vary in their application to 
the Turner standard). 
 245 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89; see infra notes 247–258 and accompanying text (explaining the rea-
soning of courts and scholars who argue that Turner should apply to equal protection claims based on 
sex within the prison context). 
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nia, limits Turner and thus leaves open the option of intermediate scrutiny for 
claims related to rights that do not conflict with incarceration.246 
Most lower courts adopting the Turner standard have not explained their 
reasoning; rather, by simply citing the decision, these courts indicate that the 
plain language of Turner forecloses the application of intermediate scrutiny to 
prisoners’ sex-based equal protection claims.247 In defending this reading, 
scholars note that the policies that led the Court to formulate the Turner stand-
ard are still at play in sex-based equal protection claims: courts do not know 
how to run prisons and prisoners do not possess the full panoply of constitu-
tional rights. 248 These scholars distinguish Johnson because sex, unlike race, is 
related to valid penological interests as evidenced by the fact that most prisons 
are segregated by sex.249 
Further, some scholars note that the language of Johnson focuses narrow-
ly on considerations unique to race.250 For example, the Supreme Court was 
particularly wary of the relationship between race and the criminal justice sys-
tem because of the system’s fraught history of racial oppression, a historical 
concern not as present with sex.251 Scholars also note that the Supreme Court 
takes seriously its role in eliminating racial discrimination and ensuring racial 
equality.252 The Court historically has not taken the same view towards sex-
                                                                                                                           
 246 See infra notes 259–266 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of those who assert 
that intermediate scrutiny applies to discrimination claims in prison). In its 2005 decision Johnson v. 
California, the Supreme Court held that the Turner standard should not be utilized for race-based 
equal protection claims. 543 U.S. 499, 510 (2005). Rather, the Supreme Court required that lower 
courts apply strict scrutiny to all claims of racial classification, including those that occurred in prison. 
Id. at 509. 
 247 May, 226 F.3d at 882 (requiring equal treatment in prison unless there is a legitimate penal 
interest advanced by unequal treatment); Quinn, 983 F.2d at 118 (stating that Turner controls in de-
termining whether a prison’s infringement on individual rights is constitutional); Benjamin, 905 F.2d 
at 575 (articulating that the Turner standard is relevant to equal protection claims even though it orig-
inally answered a First Amendment issue). 
 248 See Trevor N. McFadden, When to Turn to Turner? The Supreme Court’s Schizophrenic Pris-
on Jurisprudence, 22 J.L. & POL. 135, 178 (2006) (explaining when to apply the Turner standard in 
light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson).  
 249 Id. at 177. Prisons are generally sex-segregated out of concern that sexual relationships could 
develop, which could result in safety concerns such as unwanted pregnancies, and security concerns 
such as fights over women. See MUSHLIN, supra note 95, § 5:19. Such segregation has been upheld as 
constitutional. See, e.g., Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 
910, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (establishing that segregating prisons by sex does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
 250 McFadden, supra note 248, at 173–74.  
 251 Id. at 174. 
 252 Id. at 173. There is no question that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits sex-based discrimi-
nation as well as race-based discrimination. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). But there is also no 
question that the Equal Protection Clause was enacted with the express purpose of eradicating the 
vestiges of slavery, and was thus formulated with race in mind. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 
Wall.) 36, 37 (1873) (“[T]he main purpose of [the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments] 
was the freedom of the African race, the security and perpetuation of that freedom, and their protec-
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based classification and thus may be less concerned with sex-based distinc-
tions, as compared to those that are race-based.253 These scholars thus argue 
that the Supreme Court could not have intended Johnson to extend to equal 
protection claims based on sex.254 
Scholars also present significant pragmatic arguments against using in-
termediate scrutiny to evaluate sex-based classifications within the prison con-
text.255 For example, most prisons are segregated by sex, and men’s and wom-
en’s prisons often vary significantly in security, privileges, and conditions.256 
Although it is likely that many of these differences could be justified under 
intermediate scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny would hinder the government by 
forcing it to bear the burden of persuasion, an outcome courts may wish to 
avoid.257 Therefore, these scholars conclude that the Supreme Court did not 
intend the holding of Johnson to extend to sex-based classification and, if 
posed with the question, the Court would likely apply the Turner standard to 
equal protection claims outside of race.258 
Nevertheless, others argue that Johnson establishes that Turner is inappli-
cable to claims based on policies that do not implicate penological interests, 
including sex-based discrimination.259 To support this position, scholars note 
that in Turner, the Court was reluctant to allow judges to substitute their own 
judgment for the expertise of prison authorities where interests unique to pris-
                                                                                                                           
tion from the oppressions of the white men who had formerly held them in slavery.”) Indeed, courts 
did not begin using the Equal Protection Clause to subject sex-based discrimination to heightened 
scrutiny until 1971, more than 100 years after the amendment was ratified. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.  
 253 See McFadden, supra note 248, at 173 (noting that the Court’s commitment to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s prohibition against racial classifications strongly influenced its decision in Johnson, 
and therefore may not translate to other rights). 
 254 Id. at 177. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. See generally Donna L. Laddy, Can Women Prisoners Be Carpenters? A Proposed Analy-
sis for Equal Protection Claims of Gender Discrimination in Educational and Vocational Program-
ming at Women’s Prisons, 5 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1995) (discussing the differences in 
programming available at men’s prisons and women’s prisons). In most prisons, women have access 
to significantly fewer programs than men. Laddy, supra. 
 257 McFadden, supra note 248, at 178. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Jennifer Arnett Lee, Women Prisoners, Penological Interests, and Gender Stereotyping: An 
Application of Equal Protection Norms to Female Inmates, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 251, 271 
(2000). In Johnson, the Supreme Court stated that the Turner standard only applies to rights that con-
flict with the goals of incarceration. 543 U.S. at 510. The Court found that “[t]he right not to be dis-
criminated against . . . . is not a right that need necessarily be compromised for the sake of proper 
prison administration.” Id. Further, the Court noted that because “the government’s power is at its 
apex” in the prison context, a more stringent standard than Turner was crucial to prevent racial dis-
crimination. Id. at 511–12. In defending this decision, the Supreme Court noted that “[s]trict scrutiny 
does not preclude the ability of prison officials to address the compelling interest in prison safety” 
such that a higher standard would not hamstring officials from carrying out effective prison admin-
istration. Id. at 514. 
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ons—security, rehabilitation, and deterrence—were at stake.260 These scholars 
argue that treating men and women differently implicates only financial con-
siderations, which can be appropriately analyzed by judges.261 
Many lower courts have agreed with this analysis and elected to apply in-
termediate scrutiny to sex-based classifications in prisons.262 Specifically, 
courts have noted that the driving motivation behind Turner was a desire to 
provide significant deference to prison officials in the realm of institutional 
operations and security.263 Although personal rights, such as the right to free 
speech, may come into conflict with institutional operations and security, equal 
protection rights do not.264 Thus, some courts maintain that equal protection 
rights are not susceptible to the logic of Turner.265 These courts interpret John-
son as confirmation of this view and believe that it stands for the proposition 
that all equal protection claims should be evaluated under a higher level of 
scrutiny, regardless of whether the claims are based on race or sex.266 
                                                                                                                           
 260 Lee, supra note 259, at 271. 
 261 Id. at 274; see Pitts, 866 F.2d at 1453–54 (“Turner applies to cases involving regulations that 
govern the day-to-day operation of prisons and that restrict the exercise of prisoners’ individual rights 
within prisons. This case [of sex-based discrimination], in stark contrast, challenges general budgetary 
and policy choices made over decades in the give and take of city politics.”). The Supreme Court has 
established that the financial burden of complying with the Equal Protection Clause cannot override 
the mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977). 
 262 See, e.g., Pitts, 866 F.2d at 1455 (applying intermediate scrutiny to a sex-based equal protec-
tion claim in prison); Ashann-Ra, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 570 (same); Klinger, 824 F. Supp. at 1388 
(same). 
 263 Pitts, 866 F.2d at 1454. In the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit’s 1989 case Pitts v. Thornburg, prisoner-plaintiffs sued the District Columbia after it failed to 
build a women’s prison, which resulted in District of Columbia residents being incarcerated in West 
Virginia. Id. at 1451–52. The court noted that Turner was motivated by a desire to allow prison offi-
cials to “make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.” Id. at 1454 (quoting 
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). The court concluded that the Turner standard would be inappropriate because 
sex-based classification did not implicate these difficult judgments. Id. Ultimately, the court held that 
the action did not violate the Equal Protection clause because it was not done with the intent of harm-
ing women. Id. at 1456. 
 264 Klinger, 824 F. Supp. at 1387. In the United States District Court for the District of Nebras-
ka’s 1993 case Klinger v. Nebraska Department of Correctional Services, prisoner-plaintiffs claimed 
that the prison violated their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by providing fewer program-
ming opportunities to women than to men. Id. at 1380–81. In determining that intermediate scrutiny 
was the correct standard, the court noted that the language of Turner indicates that it applies only to 
cases that implicate prison security or the minutiae of prison operations, which in turn are rarely im-
plicated by equal protection claims. Id. at 1388. Further, the court noted that Turner made sense in the 
context of personal rights, which are necessarily limited by incarceration, but not in the context of 
equal protection because the right to be free from discrimination is not limited by incarceration. Id. 
After evaluating the plaintiffs’ claims under intermediate scrutiny, the court concluded that the pris-
on’s practice violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 1399. 
 265 See Pitts, 866 F.2d at 1454 (reasoning that intermediate scrutiny, rather than the more lenient 
Turner standard, should apply to claims of sex discrimination in the prison context); Ashann-Ra, 112 
F. Supp. 3d at 571 (same); Klinger, 824 F. Supp. at 1387 (same). 
 266 Ashann-Ra, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 571. The United States District Court for the Western District 
of Virginia’s 2000 case Ashaan-Ra v. Virginia involved a challenge to the Virginia prison system’s 
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B. Restricting Access to Menstrual Health Products in  
Prison Violates the Equal Protection Clause 
Restricting access to menstrual health products in prison should be invali-
dated as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.267 Because menstruation is 
a sex-based characteristic, discrimination on the basis of menstruation is a fa-
cial classification.268 Based on the precedent set by Johnson v. California and 
the values espoused by Turner v. Safley, sex-based discrimination should be 
evaluated under intermediate scrutiny rather than the Turner standard.269 Re-
gardless, the practice should fail under either intermediate scrutiny or the 
Turner standard because it has only a tenuous relationship to any important 
government or penological interests.270 
1. Menstruation-Based Classification Is Sex-Based Classification 
Although the disparate impact of menstruation-based classification is 
clear, a disparate impact theory would likely be unsuccessful.271 It is beyond 
dispute that restricting access to menstrual health products in prison imposes a 
clear disparate impact on women.272 Still, a disparate impact theory is unlikely 
                                                                                                                           
grooming policy, which required men to maintain short hair while permitting women to wear longer 
hair. Id. at 567. It also prohibited certain hairstyles for men that were permitted for women. Id. The 
court reasoned that the Supreme Court could not have intended Turner to apply to sex-based classifi-
cation claims because that would allow prisons to treat one sex more harshly than the other based on 
economic efficiency alone. Id. at 570. It therefore found that Turner, as clarified by Johnson, requires 
intermediate scrutiny for all equal protection claims. Id. at 571. After reviewing the claims under 
intermediate scrutiny, the court ultimately found that the policy survived intermediate scrutiny be-
cause the provisions that applied only to men related to valid penological objectives. Id. at 572. 
 267 See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (holding that constitutional violations in prison will be overturned 
unless the violation is related to penological interests); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 
(1996) (determining that sex-based classifications violate the Equal Protection Clause unless they are 
substantially related to an important government interest); Atkins, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 406 (holding that 
a prison’s failure to provide pads and other personal hygiene items constitutes an Eighth Amendment 
violation); Dawson, 527 F. Supp. at 1288–89 (finding that a prison’s failure to provide pads, along 
with other unsanitary prison conditions, violated the Eighth Amendment). 
 268 See Crawford & Waldman, supra note 205, at 472 (arguing that differential treatment based on 
menstruation is a form of facial classification on the basis of sex). 
 269 See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 510–11 (holding that strict scrutiny, rather than the Turner standard, 
should be applied to claims of racial discrimination in prison); Turner, 482 U.S. at 81 (establishing 
that constitutional violations in prison are valid if they are reasonably related to valid penological 
interests). 
 270 See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (holding that constitutional violations in prison will be overturned 
unless the violation is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests”); Virginia, 518 U.S. at 
531 (determining that sex-based classifications violate the Equal Protection Clause unless they are 
substantially related to an important government interest). 
 271 See infra notes 272–277 and accompanying text. 
 272 Crawford & Waldman, supra note 205, at 480–81 (arguing that differential treatment based on 
menstruation has a disparate impact on women because only people assigned female at birth are capa-
ble of menstruating); see also Inmate Gender, supra note 231 (noting that women constitute approxi-
mately 7% of the national prison population). In its 1997 opinion Casteneda v. Partida, the Supreme 
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to succeed because it would be very difficult—if not impossible —to prove 
that deciding to limit access to menstrual health products was because of, and 
not merely in spite of, its negative impact on women.273 First, it is likely that 
prisons are reluctant to distribute free menstrual health items because of cost 
rather than an animus toward women.274 Second, even if the decision was in 
part motivated by animus, the private nature of prison officials’ decisions 
makes it nearly impossible to uncover the smoking gun evidence of intent that 
courts have found persuasive in the past.275 In fact, many of the Arlington 
Heights factors discussed above are foreclosed by the fact that individual pris-
on officials determine prison regulations without the benefit of a public hear-
ing, open debates, or published justifications.276 Third, even if a litigator were 
to uncover evidence of animus, the government could overcome the challenge 
by demonstrating that the same outcome would result from concern for budg-
etary constraints.277 Therefore, unless the Supreme Court makes the unlikely 
                                                                                                                           
Court found the fact that Mexican-Americans only constituted 39% of grand jury summons, despite 
constituting 79.1% of the entire population, significant enough to support a disparate impact claim. 
430 U.S. at 495. 
 273 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 (establishing that, in order to succeed on a disparate impact equal 
protection claim, plaintiffs must establish that the government acted because of invidious discrimina-
tion, rather than just in spite of the negative impact on a protected class). 
 274 See Barchett, supra note 33 (discussing New York’s concerns over the cost of providing free 
menstrual health products to inmates). 
 275 Samantha Michaels, Want to Know How Your Local Jail Operates? Sorry, That May Be a Trade 
Secret., MOTHER JONES (2019), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2019/03/want-to-know-
how-your-local-jail-operates-sorry-that-may-be-a-trade-secret/ [https://perma.cc/NWY3-QXTA] (dis-
cussing roadblocks to accessing information on jail operations and procedures). Employing different 
procedures for different groups of people is one form of a smoking gun that can often lead courts to 
find discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 1978) (finding that 
a school intentionally discriminated on the basis of race when it employed different standards for 
evaluating a white student’s request to transfer schools than a black student’s request to transfer 
schools). Additionally, racist statements by legislatures or a history of racial disenfranchisement often 
lend strong support to an inference of discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Stout v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of 
Educ., 882 F.3d 998, 1006–08 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding that a town intended to discriminate against 
black people based in part on racially charged statements by supporters of the law in question and the 
town’s long history of racist laws). Given the secrecy within which prisons operate, a litigator would 
be unlikely to uncover evidence of departures from procedure or racist statements. See Michaels, 
supra. 
 276 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264–65. In its 1977 opinion Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., the Supreme Court instructed lower courts to look to the 
following five factors in evaluating whether discriminatory intent is present: (1) the historical back-
ground predating the decision; (2) the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged classi-
fication; (3) departure from normal procedure; (4) the legislative history of the action, including 
statements made by decisionmakers; (5) and the extent of the disparate impact, including whether 
there exists a clear pattern that can only be explained by animus. Id. 
 277 See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (establishing 
that state actors do not violate the constitution when their decision would have been reached regard-
less of the impermissible consideration). 
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decision to abandon the proof-of-intent requirement, a theory of disparate im-
pact is unlikely to succeed.278 
Yet there is a strong argument that restricting access to menstrual health 
products in prison facially classifies on the basis of sex, despite the difficult 
precedent set by Geduldig.279 First, contrary to its infamous reputation, the lan-
guage of Geduldig does not foreclose the possibility that pregnancy-related clas-
sifications could sometimes amount to sex-based classifications.280 Geduldig 
simply stated that not “every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is 
a sex-based classification,” but never said that no legislative classification con-
cerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification.281 Given that Geduldig al-
lowed for the possibility that at least some pregnancy-related classifications 
could be considered sex-based classifications, it does not foreclose the possi-
bility that some menstruation-related classifications could be considered sex-
based classifications as well.282 
Further, the arguments that Hibbs and Obergefell mark a departure from 
the logic of Geduldig are convincing.283 This distancing from the reasoning in 
Geduldig is not surprising given Geduldig’s widespread unpopularity.284 Con-
                                                                                                                           
 278 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (establishing that a law that imposes a disparate impact 
on a protected class does not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless officials passed the law with 
the intent of harming a protected class). 
 279 See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at  496 n.20 (holding that pregnancy discrimination is different from 
sex discrimination for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment); Crawford & Waldman, supra note 
205, at 471–72 (arguing that differential treatment on the basis of menstruation is a form of facial 
classification, despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Geduldig). 
 280 See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20. 
 281 Id. (emphasis added). 
 282 See id. 
 283 See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 675 (holding that laws prohibiting same-sex marriage violate the 
Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Hibbs, 538 U.S. 
at 735 (holding that the FMLA was a valid exercise of Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment); see also Crawford & Waldman, supra note 205, at 471–72 (arguing that the 
holdings in Obergefell and Hibbs abrogate the Court’s reasoning in Geduldig). By affirming Con-
gress’s ability to combat pregnancy-related discrimination under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Hibbs recognized that pregnancy-related discrimination posed a constitutional problem. Siegel 
& Siegel, supra note 205, at 1107; see Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735. Furthermore, the Court in Obergefell 
appeared unconcerned by the fact that not every gay person would be affected by laws prohibiting 
marriage in finding that the law impermissibly burdened gay people. See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 675; 
Crawford & Waldman, supra note 205, at 472. 
 284 See Crawford & Waldman, supra note 205, at 471 (discussing the flawed logic of Geduldig, 
including the assertion that pregnancy discrimination is not sex-based discrimination because not all 
non-pregnant people are men); Siegel & Siegel, supra note 205, at 1112 (discussing Congress’s 
amendment to Title VII following the Court’s decision in General Electric Co v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 
125 (1976), which adopted the reasoning of the Court’s holding in Geduldig that discrimination on the 
basis of pregnancy is not sex-based discrimination). One constitutional law professor recounted that 
the decision “elicit[s] disbelieving and pained laughter from generations of [her] Constitutional Law 
students” attempting to understand the reasoning. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 747, 782 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has 
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gress rejected Geduldig’s reasoning by quickly amending Title VII and clarify-
ing that discrimination based on pregnancy is a sex-based discrimination.285 
Therefore, based on the abrogation of the reasoning by subsequent Supreme 
Court decisions as well as the widespread unpopularity of the opinion, courts 
may be eager to distinguish future cases from Geduldig.286 
Further, even if the reasoning in Geduldig stands, menstruation differs 
from pregnancy in several important ways.287 First, pregnancy is usually the 
product of voluntary sexual activity whereas menstruation is completely invol-
untary.288 Therefore, similar to sex, menstruation is an immutable characteristic 
whereas pregnancy is the result of active decisions.289 Because there is not a 
layer of choice separating menstruation from sex, menstruation is more closely 
related to sex such that it could more appropriately be considered a proxy for 
sex.290 
Second, virtually all women will menstruate at some point in their lives, 
whereas a significantly smaller percentage of women will become pregnant.291 
Approximately eighty-six percent of women will give birth by the age of forty-
four.292 Conversely, 99.999% of women experience menstruation at some point 
in their lives.293 The Court in Geduldig referenced the fact that not all women 
                                                                                                                           
failed to advance the goals of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Court has compensated for this 
failure by expanding protections under the Due Process Clause). 
 285 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2018) (“The terms ‘because of 
sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy 
. . . .”). This amendment occurred following the Supreme Court’s decision in Gilbert, which extended 
the reasoning of Geduldig to Title VII. 429 U.S. at 133 (holding that discrimination on the basis of 
pregnancy is not sex-based discrimination and therefore does not violate Title VII). 
 286 See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20; supra notes 283–285 and accompanying text (discussing 
the popular distaste for, and reaction to, the Geduldig reasoning and holding). 
 287 See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20; infra notes 288–296 and accompanying text. 
 288 See generally PETER MAYLE, WHERE DID I COME FROM? (2000) (discussing that babies are 
the result of sexual intercourse between a man and a woman). Of course, pregnancies that result from 
rape are not the product of voluntary choice. Without undermining the importance of this issue, it is 
safe to say that the vast majority of pregnancies are the result of consensual sexual encounters. Melisa 
M. Holmes et al., Rape-Related Pregnancy: Estimates and Descriptive Characteristics from a Nation-
al Sample of Women, 175 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 320, 320 (1996) (finding that approx-
imately 5% of rape victims become pregnant). 
 289 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). 
 290 See id. (noting that sex is a protected characteristic in part because it is an “immutable charac-
teristic determined solely by the accident of birth”). 
 291 Claire Cain Miller, The U.S. Fertility Rate Is Down, Yet More Women Are Mothers, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/upshot/the-us-fertility-rate-is-down-yet-
more-women-are-mothers.html [https://perma.cc/BA5R-3HDY] (explaining trends in pregnancy rates 
over the past two decades).  
 292 Id. Statistics on pregnancy rates focus on how many women become pregnant before the age 
of forty-four because many women over forty-four are not capable of reproduction. Id. 
 293 Kristi A. Tough DeSapri, Amenorrhea, MEDSCAPE (Oct. 14, 2019), https://emedicine.medscape.
com/article/252928-overview [https://web.archive.org/web/20200830192326/https://emedicine.med
scape.com/article/252928-overview]. Primary amenorrhea, or the absence of a period by age sixteen, 
affects approximately one out of every 4,500 women. Id. Many women with primary amenorrhea will 
2020] Restricting Access to Menstrual Health Products in Prison 2583 
will be affected by pregnancy within their lifetime; alternatively, nearly all 
women will be affected by menstruation.294 In this way, menstruation and sex 
are more closely connected than pregnancy and sex.295 There is a strong argu-
ment that menstruation-based classifications are facial sex-based classifica-
tions.296 
2. Adopting Intermediate Scrutiny to Evaluate Sex-Based Equal Protection 
Claims 
Should a court find that restricting access to tampons in prison is a form 
of sex-based classification, the next question is determining the appropriate 
level of scrutiny.297 Based on the language of Turner and the holding in John-
son, courts should apply intermediate scrutiny rather than the Turner stand-
ard.298 
Turner formulated a test for constitutional constraints on individual rights, 
but the reasons for applying a lower standard of scrutiny to individual rights 
claims do not necessarily transfer to equal protection claims.299 Equal protec-
tion claims do not frequently undermine the operation of prisons in the way 
that individual rights claims often do.300 Similar to the right to be free from 
racial discrimination in Johnson, the right to be free from harsher treatment 
based on one’s sex does hinder effective and appropriate incarceration.301 In 
                                                                                                                           
eventually menstruate. Melissa Conrad Stöppler, Amenorrhea, MEDICINENET, https://www.medicine
net.com/amenorrhea/article.htm#amenorrhea_facts [https://perma.cc/BWL3-9VSH]. Therefore, even 
less than one out of every 4,500 women will truly never menstruate. See id. 
 294 See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496, n.20 (noting that many non-pregnant people are women); De-
Sapri, supra note 293 (establishing that 4,499 out of every 4,500 women menstruate at some point in 
their lives). 
 295 See supra notes 291–294 and accompanying text (noting that virtually all women menstruate, 
but not all women experience pregnancy). 
 296 Crawford & Waldman, supra note 205, at 471–72 (arguing that differential treatment on the 
basis of menstruation is a form of facial classification, despite the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Geduldig). 
 297 Friedmann, supra note 73, at 2550–51 n.27. 
 298 See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 510 (holding that the Turner standard does not apply to claims of 
racial discrimination in prison); Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (holding that prisons may impinge on inmates’ 
constitutional rights so long as the restrictions relate to valid penological interests). 
 299 Ashann-Ra, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 570 (noting that Turner did not hold that its rational basis 
standard should be applied to equal protection claims). 
 300 Klinger, 824 F. Supp. at 1388. 
 301 Id. The only way in which sex-based discrimination could be considered a legitimate penolog-
ical interest is in the segregation of prisons, which has been upheld as constitutional. MUSHLIN, supra 
note 95, § 5:19. Segregation based on sex is not the sort of sex-based discrimination that historically 
concerns courts so long as both sexes receive roughly equal treatment. See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 
534 (inferring that creating a separate school for women could remedy unconstitutional sex discrimi-
nation if the educational quality and value of the schools were equal); see also J. Shaw Vanze, The 
Constitutionality of Single-Sex Public Education in Pennsylvania Elementary and Secondary Schools, 
12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1479, 1489 (2010) (describing cases upholding single-sex education so long as 
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fact, much like race, treating a person less favorably based on sex is likely to 
undermine the goals of incarceration by instigating anger and disaffection and 
simultaneously threatening the legitimacy of the prison system.302 Finally, a 
court should find that an intermediate scrutiny standard is flexible enough to 
accommodate prison officials’ discretion while still protecting the rights of in-
dividuals.303 Because the Supreme Court found in Johnson that strict scrutiny 
was a sufficiently flexible standard, a court should similarly find that interme-
diate scrutiny, a comparatively lower standard, is also sufficiently flexible.304 
3. Regulations Limiting Access to Menstrual Health Products Would Be 
Overturned Under an Intermediate Scrutiny Standard 
The current practice of limiting access to menstrual health products in 
prison is unlikely to survive an intermediate scrutiny inquiry because it is not 
substantially related to an important government interest.305 There does not 
appear to be any contention that limiting access to menstrual health products 
serves any sort of safety or security purpose.306 The only interest articulated by 
prisons, outside of concerns regarding cost and distribution logistics, is that if 
women did not need to worry about the supply of menstrual health products, 
they may repurpose them for off-label uses, such as using the cotton inside the 
                                                                                                                           
the quality of education is roughly equal). Therefore, it seems likely that a court could subject harsh 
treatment based on sex to a heightened level of scrutiny without disturbing the practice of segregating 
prisoners by sex. See id. 
 302 See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 510–11 (discussing how abstaining from racial discrimination fur-
thers important penological interests). 
 303 See id. at 514 (“Strict scrutiny does not preclude the ability of prison officials to address the 
compelling interest in prison safety.”). 
 304 See, e.g., Pitts, 866 F.2d at 1455 (applying intermediate scrutiny to a sex-based equal protec-
tion claim in prison); Ashann-Ra, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 570 (“[N]either Turner nor Washington held that 
this rational basis test would apply to a prison regulation that differentiated between classes of inmates 
on the basis of race, national origin, or gender.”); Klinger, 824 F. Supp. at 1388 (finding that interme-
diate scrutiny, rather than the Turner test, is the proper test for equal protection claims based on sex in 
the prison context). 
 305 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (establishing that sex-based discrimination can only stand if it 
substantially relates to an important government interest). 
 306 See Eric Katz, Federal Law Enforcement Not Happy with Trump-Backed Criminal Justice 
Reform, GOV’T EXECUTIVE (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.govexec.com/management/2018/11/federal-
law-enforcement-not-happy-trump-backed-criminal-justice-reform/153086/ [https://perma.cc/YX5H-
J2VN] (outlining correctional officers’ concerns with the First Step Act, without mentioning that the 
provision calling for unrestricted access to menstrual health products implicates safety or security 
concerns). Prior to the First Step Act, the Bureau of Prisons issued a memo calling for unrestricted 
access to menstrual health products. Samantha Laufer, Reproductive Healthcare for Incarcerated 
Women: From “Rights” to “Dignity,” 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1785, 1802 (2019). Given correctional 
officers’ failure to express any safety or security concerns regarding unrestricted access to menstrual 
health products, it seems likely that no such concerns exist. See Katz, supra. 
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product to make earplugs or using pads to clean their cells.307 Nonetheless, this 
concern does not implicate safety or security, as there appears to be no risk that 
menstrual health products could be repurposed to harm others or interfere with 
prison security.308 Thus, this interest—preventing a scenario where the prison 
will need to purchase and distribute more menstrual health products than is 
necessary—boils down to an interest in administrative convenience and cost 
reduction, neither of which serve sufficiently important interests.309 Conse-
quently, the government would likely fail to meet its burden.310 
But even if preventing off-label uses was adjudicated to be an important 
government interest, it is still unlikely that a court would find that the regula-
tion substantially relates to such interest.311 First, the practice is overinclusive 
because there are other viable alternatives, as evidenced by the fact that federal 
prisons and prisons in fourteen states currently provide unrestricted access to 
menstrual health products.312 Further, the practice is underinclusive insofar as 
                                                                                                                           
 307 Chandra Bozelko, Prisons That Withhold Menstrual Pads Humiliate Women and Violate Basic 
Rights, THE GUARDIAN (June 12, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/12/
prisons-menstrual-pads-humiliate-women-violate-rights [https://perma.cc/9W4K-FXG2]. Bozelko 
was a former inmate at York Correctional Institution in Niantic, Connecticut, where she served a six-
year sentence. Id. She notes that, although pads and tampons are “precious resources” in prison, wom-
en will occasionally utilize them for reasons other than menstrual health care. Id. She asserts that such 
uses should not be utilized as a reason to prevent access to menstrual health products, as “these alter-
native uses fill other unfilled needs for a woman to maintain her physical and mental health.” Id. Bo-
zelko notes that “[i]f [prisoners] had adequate cleaning supplies, proper noise control, band-aids for 
[their] blisters or stable beds,” they would use menstrual health products for their intended purpose. 
Id. 
 308 See Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and Implementation of the First Step Act of 
2018: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 116th Cong. 3–6 (2019) (statement of Kathleen Hawk Sawyer, Director, Federal Bureau of 
Prisons) [hereinafter Sawyer Statement] (reporting on the progress of the Bureau of Prison’s imple-
mentation of the First Step Act, which required providing access to free menstrual health products, 
without articulating any security or safety concerns). 
 309 See Laufer, supra note 306 (explaining concerns over the cost of providing menstrual health 
products and the method of distributing products). 
 310 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690 (establishing that administrative efficiency and convenience cannot 
constitute an important government interest). 
 311 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (establishing that differential treatment on the basis of sex is 
unconstitutional unless it is substantially related to an important government interest). 
 312 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004); see also First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 
115-391 § 611, 132 Stat. 5194, 5274 (requiring federal prisons to provide menstrual health products to 
female inmates); Lydia O’Connor, Federal Prisons Made Menstrual Products Free. Now Some States 
May Follow Suit., HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/state-prison-
free-pads-tampons_n_5a7b427be4b08dfc92ff5231 [https://perma.cc/L3PL-XB2E] (discussing state 
laws requiring prisons to provide menstrual health products to female inmates); Walker, supra note 11 
(explaining that thirty-six states have laws requiring access to menstrual health products in prison). A 
practice is considered overinclusive if the government’s interest could be achieved in a less restrictive 
manner. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 666; see also supra note 108 and accompanying text (explaining the 
doctrine of over-inclusivity). Therefore, if courts can identify a reasonable and viable alternative for 
achieving the government’s interest in a way that does not infringe on an individual’s constitutional 
rights, courts are likely to find that the practice is overinclusive. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 666 (finding a 
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women already receive some menstrual health products, therefore negating any 
claim that access to menstrual health products is a safety concern.313 
4. Regulations Limiting Access to Menstrual Health Products Would Also 
Be Overturned Under the Lower Turner Standard 
Even if a court were to apply the Turner standard instead of intermediate 
scrutiny, a regulation limiting access to menstrual health products likely could 
not stand.314 First, although there is a valid penological interest in conserving 
resources, the restriction is not reasonably related to such a purpose because it 
does not conserve a significant amount of resources.315 The State of New York 
estimates that it would cost approximately thirteen thousand dollars per year to 
provide unlimited menstrual health products to its four thousand prisoners, 
which averages out to approximately $3.25 per prisoner per year.316 Assuming 
this rate would be consistent across the United States, it would cost taxpayers a 
total of $750,750.00 per year to provide unrestricted access to menstrual health 
products for all 231,000 female prisoners in the United States.317 Given that the 
prison industry’s total operating budget is approximately eighty billion dollars 
per year, this would only increase the budget by approximately 0.0000093%.318 
This negligible increase cannot be viewed as reasonably related to the goal of 
conserving resources.319 Based on the trend of lower courts finding in favor of 
plaintiff-prisoners who satisfy the first prong of Turner, courts may find this 
                                                                                                                           
law restricting internet speech overinclusive because the government’s interest could be achieved by 
imposing less of a burden on individual rights, such as software that blocked or filtered inappropriate 
content). 
 313 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52 (1994). A practice is considered underinclusive if 
the law fails to regulate individuals or activities that pose the same fundamental threat to the govern-
ment’s interest as the person or activity restricted by the law. See id. Therefore, if courts can identify 
that the threat is left unregulated in other areas, courts are likely to find that the practice is underinclu-
sive. See id. (finding a law prohibiting certain residential signs underinclusive because the law failed 
to regulate activities that posed the same fundamental threat). 
 314 See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (articulating a lower standard for evaluating infringements on con-
stitutional rights in the prison context). 
 315 See Barchett, supra note 33 (noting that providing unlimited menstrual health products would 
cost approximately $3.25 per prisoner per year). 
 316 See id. 
 317 See id. 
 318 See Melissa S. Kearney et al., Ten Economic Facts About Crime and Incarceration in the 
United States, HAMILTON PROJECT (May 1, 2014), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/ten_
economic_facts_about_crime_and_incarceration_in_the_united_states [https://perma.cc/9XT4-YZA3] 
(explaining the economic impact of mass incarceration on taxpayers). The prison industry’s total op-
erating budget includes federal, state, and local spending. Id. 
 319 See id. 
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fact sufficient to overturn the policy of restricting access to menstrual health 
products.320 
Even if the court were to look beyond the first prong, two of the three re-
maining prongs also favor requiring prisons to provide adequate access to 
menstrual health products.321 The third prong of the test is satisfied because the 
cost of the accommodation is relatively slight.322 Even beyond the financial 
cost, there is no negative ripple effect stemming from providing unlimited ac-
cess to menstrual health products; prisons that currently engage in this practice 
serve as proof that there are no negative side effects.323 If anything, there could 
be a positive ripple effect by putting all prisoners on equal footing, regardless 
of whether they have the resources to afford extra menstrual health products.324 
Finally, given the low financial cost and the low burden to staff, who are al-
ready charged with distributing products, providing free unlimited menstrual 
health products in prison is an “obvious, easy alternative” and thus satisfies the 
fourth prong of Turner.325 The federal government and fourteen states that al-
ready provide unlimited access to these products prove it is, in fact, an “obvi-
ous, easy alternative.”326 
The only Turner prong which may not point in favor of providing unlim-
ited access to menstrual health products is the second prong, which considers 
whether prisoners are provided alternative means to exercise their rights.327 
The government could argue that women in prison are provided alternatives, 
such as buying tampons from the commissary or obtaining a doctor’s note au-
thorizing receipt of additional tampons.328 The relatively high cost of these 
                                                                                                                           
 320 See MUSHLIN, supra note 95, § 2:9 (“The primary recommendation is that the first factor 
ought to be determinative if it favors the prisoner’s claim.”). 
 321 See id. § 2:4 (noting that the third prong of Turner asks whether accommodating the prisoner’s 
right would have a negative ripple effect throughout the prison and the fourth prong of Turner asks 
whether there are “obvious, easy” alternatives for the prison to meet its goals without burdening con-
stitutional rights). 
 322 See id. § 2:7. 
 323 See Sawyer Statement, supra note 308, at 6 (listing the provision of free menstrual health 
products as one of the Bureau of Prison’s “accomplishments,” without noting any challenges stem-
ming from providing free menstrual health products). 
 324 See MUSHLIN, supra note 95, § 2:7 (discussing the impact of ripple effects on courts’ Turner 
analyses); Greenberg, supra note 6 (discussing how menstrual health products become items of com-
petition in prisons where those items are restricted); see also supra note 125 (explaining how courts 
often consider jealousy as one of the ripple effects of accommodating individual rights). 
 325 See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90–91. 
 326 See First Step Act of 2018 § 611 (requiring federal prisons to provide free pads and tampons 
to female inmates); Walker, supra note 11 (explaining that thirty-six states have laws requiring access 
to menstrual health products in prison). 
 327 See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (discussing the factors that should be considered in determining 
whether an infringement on a constitutional right is reasonably related to a valid penological interest). 
 328 Michaels, supra note 12. 
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items, however, precludes this option for many indigent prisoners.329 Nonethe-
less, even if a court were to find that the second prong favored the government, 
that prong is not outcome determinative.330 Generally, the first and fourth 
prongs are given greater consideration.331 Because these two prongs favor re-
quiring unlimited access to menstrual health products, the prisoner-plaintiffs 
would still likely succeed in bringing an equal protection claim under either 
intermediate scrutiny or the Turner standard.332 
IV. DENIAL OF MENSTRUAL HEALTH PRODUCTS AS AN  
EIGHTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION 
Very few lower courts have considered whether a prison’s practice of re-
stricting access to menstrual health products violates the Eighth Amend-
ment.333 The courts that have considered the practice typically view it as part 
of a larger constellation of conditions and therefore have not considered 
whether the restriction on its own constitutes an Eighth Amendment viola-
tion.334 Nonetheless, the few scholars who have considered the issue in isola-
                                                                                                                           
 329 See Sawyer, supra note 39. The average minimum wage in prisons is $0.14 per hour. Id. 
Therefore, a prisoner making minimum wage would have to work more than twenty-five hours to 
afford a copay to see a doctor. Id. The average commissary charges $0.56 per tampon. Michaels, su-
pra note 12. Consequently, a prisoner making minimum wage would have to work approximately 
sixty-four hours in order to afford a sixteen-count box of tampons. See Sawyer, supra note 39. Be-
cause women are advised to change their tampons every four hours, a sixteen-count box of tampons 
would not last many women through one cycle. See id. 
 330 MUSHLIN, supra note 95, § 2:9. 
 331 Id. (noting that the first and fourth prong are the most important because they address the 
reasonableness of the restriction, which is the core inquiry in Turner). 
 332 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (determining that sex-based classifications violate the Equal 
Protection Clause unless they are substantially related to an important government interest); Turner, 
482 U.S. at 93 (holding that regulations that infringe on prisoners’ constitutional rights will be over-
turned unless the regulation is “reasonably related to valid corrections goals”). 
 333 Semelbauer v. Muskegon Cty., No. 1:14-CV-1245, 2015 WL 9906265, at *9 (W.D. Mich. 
2015) (considering an inmate’s claim that the prison violated her Eighth Amendment rights by delay-
ing access to menstrual health products); Atkins v. Cty. of Orange, 372 F. Supp. 2d 377, 406 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (considering whether withholding personal hygiene items, including menstrual health 
products, violated the Eighth Amendment); Dawson v. Kendrick, 527 F. Supp. 1252, 1288–89 (S.D.W. 
Va. 1981) (considering whether a prison’s aggregated conditions, including its denial of menstrual 
health products, violated the Eighth Amendment). 
 334 Semelbauer, 2015 WL 9906265, at *9 (finding that temporary and infrequent delays in provid-
ing menstrual health products did not violate the Eighth Amendment); Atkins, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 406 
(holding that a prison’s failure to provide pads and other personal hygiene items constituted an Eighth 
Amendment violation); Dawson, 527 F. Supp. at 1288–89 (finding that a prison’s failure to provide 
pads, along with other unsanitary prison conditions, violated the Eighth Amendment). None of the 
plaintiffs claimed that the practice of restricting access to menstrual health products on its own consti-
tuted a violation of the Eighth Amendment, but rather claimed that the practice in conjunction with 
other deprivations was a violation. Semelbauer, 2015 WL 9906265, at *9 (noting that plaintiffs argued 
that the combination of the prison’s failure to provide menstrual health products and the plaintiff’s 
inability to receive clean laundry together violated the Eighth Amendment); Atkins, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 
406 (noting that the plaintiff claimed she was “denied basic hygiene products such as toilet paper, 
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tion have concluded that restricting access to menstrual health products could 
violate the Eighth Amendment.335 Section A of this Part reviews prior court 
decisions and scholarly articles considering the constitutionality of restricting 
access to menstrual health products under the Eighth Amendment.336 Section B 
then argues that this practice could violate the Eighth Amendment so long as 
the plaintiff establishes enough facts to constitute deliberate indifference.337 
A. The Eighth Amendment and Menstrual Health in Prison 
The few lower courts that have considered whether a prison restricting 
access to menstrual health products violates the Eighth Amendment have 
reached different conclusions.338 In 1981 in Dawson v. Kendrick, the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia found that the 
prison’s failure to provide clean bedding, towels, clothing, sanitary mattresses, 
and toilet articles, including sanitary napkins, violated the Eighth Amend-
ment.339 The court noted that the culmination of these deprivations often re-
sulted in parasitic skin conditions and served no legitimate penological pur-
pose.340 Because the court looked at the prison conditions as a whole rather 
than individually, it is impossible to know how much the court considered the 
lack of access to menstrual health products in particular.341 Citing Dawson, the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York similarly 
found in 2005 in Atkins v. County of Orange that a correctional officer’s failure 
to provide pads to an inmate could constitute an Eighth Amendment viola-
tion.342 
Conversely, in 2015 in Semelbauer v. Muskegon County, the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Michigan found that temporary and 
infrequent delays in access to menstrual health products, toilet paper, and un-
                                                                                                                           
toothbrush and sanitary napkins”); Dawson, 527 F. Supp. at 1288–89 (noting that plaintiffs claimed 
the prison violated their Eighth Amendment rights because the prison failed to provide bedding, tow-
els, clothing, mattresses, and various toilet articles, including pads). 
 335 Shaw, supra note 31, at 491 (arguing that the practice of restricting access to menstrual health 
products could violate the Eighth Amendment); Walsh, supra note 196, at 66 (same). 
 336 See infra notes 338–351 and accompanying text. 
 337 See infra notes 352–371 and accompanying text. 
 338 Semelbauer, 2015 WL 9906265, at *9 (finding that a prison’s failure to promptly provide 
menstrual health products did not violate the Eighth Amendment); Atkins, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 406 
(holding that failure to provide personal hygiene items, including pads, violated the Eighth Amend-
ment); Dawson, 527 F. Supp. at 1288–89 (finding that a prison’s unsanitary conditions and failure to 
provide menstrual health products violated the Eighth Amendment). 
 339 527 F. Supp. at 1288–89. 
 340 Id. at 1289. 
 341 Id. at 1288–89. 
 342 372 F. Supp. 2d at 406. In ruling on defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court 
found that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether the plaintiff was denied access to 
pads. Id. If proven, this conduct could have constituted an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. There is 
no subsequent case history following the court’s ruling on summary judgment. 
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derwear did not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.343 In reaching its 
decision, the court seemed to acknowledge that the prison’s failure to provide 
adequate hygiene items could constitute an Eighth Amendment violation if the 
deprivation was ongoing or long-lasting.344 But the court concluded that, be-
cause the plaintiffs in this case alleged only a single delay of two days or less 
before ultimately receiving the items, the deprivation was de minimis and 
could not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.345 
A number of scholars have argued that restricting access to menstrual 
health products could violate the Eighth Amendment.346 These scholars recog-
nize that plaintiffs who have been consistently denied access to menstrual 
health products, particularly those who suffered adverse health consequences 
as a result, could bring a colorable Eighth Amendment claim.347 Although 
Semelbauer sets a bleak precedent, the Eighth Amendment analysis is extreme-
ly fact-specific and a different scenario could lead to a successful claim.348 For 
example, deliberate indifference could be well-established in prisons where 
women frequently bleed through their uniforms.349 Further, women who have 
not been provided an adequate amount of menstrual health products could have 
                                                                                                                           
 343 2015 WL 9906265, at *9. The prisoner-plaintiffs in Semelbauer v. Muskegon County alleged 
that female inmates were not provided with pads at an appropriate frequency. Id. at *8. They also 
claimed that the prison sometimes did not provide any pads. Id. But in making their complaint, plain-
tiffs only identified a delay in receiving menstrual health products ranging from several hours to two 
days. Id. at *9. 
 344 See id. at *9  (“While ‘hygiene’ has also been generally identified as a basic need deserving of 
Eighth Amendment protection, the Court determines that the nature and duration of the alleged depri-
vations in this case similarly lead to the conclusion that Plaintiffs have not stated a plausible Eighth 
Amendment violation.” (citations omitted) (quoting Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 Fed. App’x 427, 430 (6th 
Cir. 2003)) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976))). 
 345 Id. at *9–10. A deprivation is considered de minimis if it is trifling or negligible such that it is 
easy for the court to overlook it. De Minimis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 146. 
 346 Shaw, supra note 31, at 491 (arguing that the practice of restricting access to menstrual health 
products could violate the Eighth Amendment); Walsh, supra note 196, at 66 (same). 
 347 Shaw, supra note 31, at 491–92. 
 348 See Semelbauer, 2015 WL 9906265, at *9; Walsh, supra note 196, at 66 (arguing that, with a 
proper set of facts, prisoners could establish that restricting access to menstrual health products vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment). 
 349 See Walsh, supra note 196, at 67 (noting that, despite the holding in Semelbauer, women in 
other jurisdictions may be able to establish that failure to provide adequate menstrual health products 
violates the Eighth Amendment). Recall that deliberate indifference requires that a prison official be 
actually aware there is a risk of harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (noting that, to 
establish deliberate indifference, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference 
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference”). 
Kate Walsh notes that the court in Semelbauer “fails to address that ‘incidents where Defendants ig-
nored or mocked Plaintiffs’ pleas for sanitary supplies’ . . . may provide plaintiffs with more persua-
sive arguments.” Walsh, supra note 196, at 67 (quoting Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ 
Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings at 16, Semelbauer, No. 1:14-CV-1245). According to 
Walsh, such instances could exhibit the level of deliberate indifference that was missing from Sem-
elbauer. Id. 
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a stronger case than those whose access was simply delayed.350 Therefore, alt-
hough courts have yet to recognize that restricting access to menstrual health 
products in prison is an Eighth Amendment violation on its own, there are 
strong arguments in favor of this position.351 
B. Restricting Access to Menstrual Health Products in Prison Could  
Violate the Eighth Amendment in Some Jurisdictions 
Restricting access to menstrual health products should be invalidated un-
der the Eighth Amendment in situations where deliberate indifference can be 
established.352 Recent activism surrounding the treatment of women in prison, 
coupled with the growing media coverage of the health risks associated with 
depriving women’s access to menstrual health products in prison, would likely 
allow prisoners to establish deliberate indifference by correctional officials.353 
Further, the risk of future harm to women’s health caused by poor menstrual 
hygiene over a prolonged period of time is sufficiently serious and therefore 
constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation.354 
1. Establishing Deliberate Indifference with the Right Facts 
It is notoriously difficult to demonstrate deliberate indifference.355 Still, it 
may be possible to demonstrate that prison officials exhibited deliberate indif-
                                                                                                                           
 350 Walsh, supra note 196, at 68. Walsh notes that courts are more likely to view “continuous, 
systematic deprivations” as Eighth Amendment violations as opposed to “single, short incidents.” Id. 
Walsh underscores that, in Todaro v. Ward, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
noted that, “while a single instance of medical care denied or delayed, viewed in isolation, may appear 
to be the product of mere negligence, repeated examples of such treatment bespeak a deliberate indif-
ference by prison authorities to the agony engendered by haphazard and ill-conceived procedures.” Id. 
at 68 n.125 (quoting 565 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1977)). Thus, both because of the severity of the depri-
vation and its “continuous, systematic nature,” courts may be more likely to distinguish cases where 
plaintiffs are regularly denied adequate access to menstrual health products from the logic in Sem-
elbauer. Id. at 67–69. 
 351 Shaw, supra note 31, at 491 (arguing that inadequate access to menstrual health products in 
prison violates the Eighth Amendment because it puts women at an unreasonable risk of future harm); 
Walsh, supra note 196, at 66 (same). 
 352 See infra notes 355–371 and accompanying text (arguing that a failure to provide access to 
menstrual health products in prison places women at an unreasonable risk of future harm and articulat-
ing circumstances where it may be possible to establish deliberate indifference). 
 353 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (establishing that deliberate indifference towards a prisoner’s 
serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment). 
 354 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (“In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or 
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only 
such indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of decency’ in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment.”). 
 355 Jeffrey M. Lipman, Eighth Amendment and Deliberate Indifference Standard for Prisoners: 
Eighth Circuit Outlook, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 435, 446 (1998) (noting that the deliberate indiffer-
ence “standard is very difficult and impractical, placing an incredible burden on the inmate”). 
2592 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:2541 
ference by failing to provide adequate access to menstrual health products giv-
en the recent publicity that the problem has received.356 
Some lay people may not realize the dangers that stem from only provid-
ing ten thin pads per month, undermining the obviousness of the risk.357 There-
fore, to establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff would need to demonstrate 
that the prison officials were aware of the risk and declined to take action.358 
This could best be established in one of the counties where activists have lob-
bied for adequate access to menstrual health products.359 If activists provided 
these prisons with clear information about the health risks that stem from poor 
menstrual hygiene, the plaintiffs could potentially build a strong claim.360 
Likewise, deliberate indifference could be established in a prison where 
an inmate contracted a serious illness as a result of inadequate menstrual health 
and notified prison officials of the ailment. 361 Because the deliberate indiffer-
ence inquiry is highly fact specific, it can be difficult to predict its success.362 
Yet the prevalence of activism surrounding prisoners’ menstrual health and the 
subsequent media attention is helpful in demonstrating deliberate indiffer-
ence.363 In this way, grassroots activism can serve an important role in support-
ing successful litigation.364 
2. Denying Adequate Access to Menstrual Health Products Constitutes a 
Serious Medical Need 
If a plaintiff were to succeed in demonstrating that prison officials exhib-
ited deliberate indifference, the argument that restricting access to menstrual 
health products poses a serious medical need would be relatively straightfor-
                                                                                                                           
 356 See Witte, supra note 4 (discussing the #MeToo movement’s effort to publicize the current 
state of access to menstrual health products in prison). 
 357 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8 (noting that, although not conclusive, the obviousness of a 
risk can be persuasive evidence in establishing deliberate indifference). 
 358 Lipman, supra note 355, at 442 (illustrating how plaintiffs may establish deliberate indiffer-
ence).  
 359 Marimow, supra note 1 (discussing advocacy for increased access to menstrual health prod-
ucts in prison). 
 360 See, e.g., Witte, supra note 4 (noting advocacy by former prisoners to educate legislators and 
prison officials about the lack of access to menstrual health products and the resulting health risks). 
 361 See id. (providing testimony by a former prisoner who suffered medical complications due to 
poor menstrual hygiene during her time in prison). 
 362 See Lipman, supra note 355, at 439 (noting the difficulty of establishing deliberate indiffer-
ence and the need for highly persuasive facts). 
 363 See Witte, supra note 4 (discussing the recent surge in activism around access to menstrual 
health products in prison). 
 364 See id. (discussing grassroots efforts to call attention to the current state of access to menstrual 
health products in prison). 
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ward.365 The seriousness of toxic shock syndrome and bacterial infections is 
beyond dispute, and neither serve any legitimate penological purpose.366 Alt-
hough it is true that restricting access to menstrual health products does not 
generally cause significant pain or inhibit daily acts in the immediacy, the sig-
nificant threat of developing toxic shock syndrome or a bacterial infection, 
combined with the related and long-term complications, demonstrates a serious 
risk of future harm.367 
Thus, each of the factors that courts generally consider persuasive in as-
sessing whether the serious medical need element is satisfied are met with re-
gards to restricting access to menstrual health products in prison.368 By focus-
ing on the risk of future harm—rather than just the discomfort and embarrass-
ment of bleeding through one’s uniform—litigators could establish that the 
repeated and prolonged denial of basic menstrual health products constitutes a 
serious medical need.369 Perhaps the strongest case would be in a prison where 
women are only provided ten pads per month because it is a regular and pro-
longed practice and poses a significant risk of future harm.370 Therefore, as 
long as the particular facts lend themselves to a showing of deliberate indiffer-
ence, an Eighth Amendment claim would likely succeed.371 
CONCLUSION 
Although prison officials are provided significant deference in how they 
manage the day-to-day operations of prisons, the Constitution cabins their dis-
                                                                                                                           
 365 See infra notes 366–368 and accompanying text (explaining why the health risks inherent in 
denying women the means to practice proper menstrual hygiene constitutes a serious medical need 
under the Eighth Amendment). 
 366 See 21 C.F.R. § 801.430 (2019) (requiring warnings about toxic shock syndrome to be posted 
on boxes of tampons). The risk has been adequately recognized by medical experts, who express clear 
consensus that women should change their pads or tampons every four to eight hours while they are 
menstruating. Shaw, supra note 31, at 484. Furthermore, although not every lay person may know the 
exact health risks that accompany poor menstrual hygiene, the importance of menstrual hygiene and 
warnings about toxic shock syndrome are taught in many health classes and posted on tampon boxes 
such that the lay person likely has some awareness of the importance of menstrual hygiene. See 21 
C.F.R. § 801.430. 
 367 See supra notes 56–65 and accompanying text (discussing the health risks of poor menstrual 
health in prison). Poor menstrual health threatens permanent loss due to the increased risk of correc-
tive hysterectomies or cervical cancer. Weiss-Wolf, supra note 65. 
 368 See supra notes 366–367 and accompanying text. 
 369 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 34 (1993) (establishing that the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibits prison officials from exposing inmates to an unreasonable risk of future harm). 
 370 See Semelbauer, 2015 WL 9906265, at *10 (dismissing a plaintiff’s complaint that a correc-
tional officer’s refusal to provide her with pads constituted an Eighth Amendment violation because 
the deprivation occurred only one time for a maximum of two days and therefore constituted a de 
minimis deprivation); Barchett, supra note 33 (noting that, on average, prisons provide only ten free 
pads per month). 
 371 See supra notes 353–370 and accompany text (arguing that the current practice of restricting 
access to menstrual health products violates the Eighth Amendment). 
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cretion. Despite the high standards required to prove an Equal Protection 
Clause and Eighth Amendment violation, prisoners who have been denied ade-
quate access to menstrual health products and forced to maintain poor men-
strual health during their prison sentences may be able to bring a successful 
constitutional challenge. Denying access to menstrual health products is a form 
of sex-based classification that is neither substantially related to a compelling 
government interest nor reasonably related to a valid penological interest. Fur-
thermore, the risk of future harm inherent in prolonged poor menstrual hygiene 
constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment if the facts establish the pris-
on official’s subjective awareness of the harm. Although legislative reforms 
have been successful in many parts of the country, judicial action is necessary 
to ensure that the health of female inmates is guaranteed rather than subject to 
the will of the majority. 
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